## Facts

- Massachusetts amended its Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act in 2007 to criminalize knowingly standing on a public way or sidewalk within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to a qualifying reproductive health care facility.
- The statute applied only to facilities offering or performing abortions outside hospital grounds and included exemptions, including for facility employees or agents acting within the scope of employment.
- Petitioners regularly engaged in “sidewalk counseling” near clinic entrances, seeking calm, consensual, one-on-one conversations and distributing literature about alternatives to abortion.
- Petitioners alleged the fixed buffer zones pushed them away from clinic entrances, reduced their ability to identify clinic entrants, and substantially impaired close personal communication and leafleting.
- Massachusetts justified the law by citing a history of crowding, obstruction, and violence outside clinics and asserted interests in public safety, patient access, and unobstructed sidewalks and streets.
- Lower courts upheld the law as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation that left adequate alternative channels for communication.

## Issues

1. Whether the 35-foot fixed buffer-zone law on public sidewalks and ways is a permissible content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction under the First Amendment.
2. Whether the law is narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests while leaving open ample alternative channels for communication.
3. Whether the statute’s clinic-specific scope and exemptions render it content-based or viewpoint discriminatory.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court unanimously held the buffer-zone provision violated the First Amendment.
- The Court treated the law as content-neutral and applied intermediate scrutiny applicable to time, place, and manner regulations in traditional public fora.
- The Court held the law was not narrowly tailored because it burdened substantially more speech than necessary to advance the Commonwealth’s asserted interests.
- The Court declined to overrule Hill v. Colorado, resolving the case on narrow-tailoring grounds.
- Concurring opinions would have found the law content-based and/or viewpoint discriminatory and unconstitutional on that basis.

## Legal Principles

- Public sidewalks and ways are traditional public fora; regulations there must be content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication.
- A law may be content-neutral if liability turns on where a person speaks rather than what is said and if the government’s justification is not tied to message content.
- Narrow tailoring requires the government to avoid burdening substantially more speech than necessary; broad prophylactic restrictions are suspect when less restrictive, more targeted tools are available.
- When a law meaningfully impairs close, personal conversations and leafleting, the existence of speech opportunities farther away may be inadequate as an alternative channel for that form of communication.

## Conclusion

The Court invalidated Massachusetts’ 35-foot fixed buffer zones around abortion-clinic entrances because, even as a content-neutral regulation in a traditional public forum, the law was not narrowly tailored and restricted more speech than necessary to protect safety and access.


McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014)