## Facts

- Federal law set two types of limits on individual contributions in federal elections: (1) base limits on contributions to any single candidate or committee and (2) biennial aggregate limits on total contributions to all federal candidates, party committees, and PACs combined.
- For the 2011–2012 election cycle, the aggregate limits capped total contributions at $46,200 to all federal candidates and $70,800 to party committees and PACs, for a combined $117,000 ceiling, while base limits (e.g., per-candidate, per-committee caps) remained separately applicable.
- Shaun McCutcheon, an individual donor, contributed to multiple federal candidates and Republican committees within the base limits but sought to contribute to additional candidates and committees in base-limit amounts that would exceed the aggregate caps.
- The Republican National Committee joined the challenge, alleging that the aggregate limits restricted donors’ ability to support candidates and committees.
- Plaintiffs sued the Federal Election Commission in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to enjoin enforcement of the aggregate limits.
- A three-judge district court upheld the aggregate limits, relying on precedent that had sustained similar total-contribution caps.
- The Supreme Court reviewed the case and issued a divided decision invalidating the aggregate limits.

## Issues

1. Whether FECA’s biennial aggregate limits on an individual’s total contributions to all federal candidates, party committees, and PACs violate the First Amendment.
2. Whether the aggregate limits are sufficiently tailored to the only permissible campaign-finance interest recognized for contribution limits: preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.
3. Whether preventing circumvention of base limits justifies aggregate limits given existing anti-earmarking rules and disclosure requirements.

## Decision

- The Court held, 5–4, that FECA’s biennial aggregate contribution limits are unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
- A plurality opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito) concluded the aggregate limits were not “closely drawn” to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.
- Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, agreeing the aggregate limits must fall, and stating that contribution limits generally should be subject to strict scrutiny and are unconstitutional.
- Justice Breyer dissented (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan), arguing that aggregate limits protect electoral integrity and prevent circumvention of base limits.
- The judgment left base contribution limits intact while eliminating the overall caps on total contributions across candidates and committees.

## Legal Principles

- Contributing to candidates and political committees is protected First Amendment activity involving political expression and association.
- Contribution limits are valid only when justified by preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance; seeking to limit “influence or access” or to equalize political influence is not a permissible objective.
- Even under “closely drawn” review, courts must evaluate the fit between the governmental objective and the means chosen; limits that substantially restrict the number of candidates and committees a donor may support require strong justification.
- Anti-circumvention interests must be addressed with measures that are more targeted than broad aggregate caps when existing rules (such as earmarking restrictions and disclosure requirements) substantially mitigate the asserted risks.
- Aggregate contribution limits that do not meaningfully advance the quid pro quo anti-corruption interest, or that burden substantially more speech and association than necessary, violate the First Amendment.

## Conclusion

The Court invalidated federal biennial aggregate contribution limits because they were not sufficiently tailored to preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, while leaving per-candidate and per-committee base limits in place and narrowing the scope of permissible campaign-finance regulation to direct exchange corruption concerns.


McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014)