Facts
- Tennessee’s constitution barred “ministers of the Gospel” and “priests of any denomination whatever” from serving in the state legislature.
- A Tennessee statute made eligibility for delegates to a state constitutional convention identical to eligibility for members of the state House of Representatives, thereby applying the clergy-disqualification rule to convention delegates.
- Paul A. McDaniel, an ordained Baptist minister, filed to run as a delegate to the 1977 Tennessee constitutional convention.
- Selma Cash Paty, an opposing candidate, sought a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was ineligible because of his ordained status.
- The trial court held the disqualification unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; McDaniel remained on the ballot and was elected.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, reasoning the provision did not burden belief and permissibly restricted religious action in lawmaking to avoid establishment concerns.
Issues
- Whether a state may categorically disqualify ordained ministers from serving in elective office, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
- Whether asserted separation-of-church-and-state interests justify excluding clergy from the political process.
Decision
- The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Tennessee Supreme Court and remanded.
- A plurality concluded the disqualification imposed a substantial burden on free exercise by forcing a choice between religious vocation and candidacy for office.
- The plurality held Tennessee failed to justify the categorical exclusion with interests sufficient to override the free exercise burden.
- Concurring Justices agreed the provision was unconstitutional, with varying rationales, including that the rule functioned as an impermissible religious test in effect.
- Justice Blackmun did not participate.
Legal Principles
- The Free Exercise Clause prohibits conditioning access to public office on surrender of religious status or religiously motivated practice.
- Laws that single out religious officeholders for civil disabilities impose a substantial burden on free exercise and require a justification of the highest order.
- The Establishment Clause does not authorize a State to exclude clergy from office by categorical discrimination against religious status absent a sufficiently compelling, current justification.
- A formal test of religious belief is not required for unconstitutionality; disqualifications defined by religious office can operate as a religious test in substance.
Conclusion
Tennessee’s categorical exclusion of ordained ministers from serving as constitutional convention delegates, by incorporating a clergy-disqualification rule for legislators, violated the Free Exercise Clause as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment because it forced individuals to choose between religious calling and political participation without adequate justification.