## Facts

- Jose Ernesto Medellín, a Mexican national, was convicted in Texas state court for the rape and murder of two teenage girls and sentenced to death.
- Authorities failed to inform Medellín of his right to consular notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
- The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in *Avena*, concluded that the United States violated the Vienna Convention as to 51 named Mexican nationals, including Medellín, and required “review and reconsideration” of their convictions and sentences notwithstanding state procedural default rules.
- After *Avena*, the President issued a memorandum directing state courts to give effect to the ICJ judgment to discharge the United States’ international obligations.
- Medellín filed a successive state habeas application in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relying on *Avena* and the presidential memorandum; the court dismissed it under Texas’s limits on successive petitions (“abuse of the writ”).
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether *Avena* and/or the presidential memorandum bound state courts as domestic law.

## Issues

1. Whether the ICJ’s *Avena* judgment constituted directly enforceable federal law that preempted Texas procedural limits on successive habeas petitions.
2. Whether the relevant treaty sources (including the Optional Protocol, the U.N. Charter, and the ICJ Statute) were self-executing so as to make the *Avena* obligation enforceable in U.S. courts without implementing legislation.
3. Whether the President had constitutional or statutory authority to require state courts to comply with *Avena* by memorandum.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
- The Court held that neither the ICJ’s *Avena* judgment nor the President’s memorandum constituted directly enforceable federal law that preempted Texas’s procedural restrictions on successive habeas petitions.
- The Court concluded the relevant treaty provisions created international commitments but were not self-executing domestic law, and Congress had enacted no implementing statute making *Avena* judicially enforceable in state courts.
- The Court held the President lacked authority, absent congressional authorization, to convert a non-self-executing international obligation into binding domestic law applicable to the States.

## Legal Principles

- Treaties are not enforceable as domestic law unless (1) the treaty is self-executing—operating of itself without legislative aid—or (2) Congress enacts implementing legislation.
- An ICJ judgment may bind the United States internationally but does not, without domestic legal authorization, constitute enforceable federal law in U.S. courts.
- Treaty language such as an undertaking to comply may reflect a commitment for political-branch action rather than a rule directed to domestic courts.
- The President’s foreign affairs authority does not include a general power to make domestic law or to override state procedural rules without authorization from Congress.
- State procedural rules in criminal postconviction proceedings remain controlling unless displaced by valid, enforceable federal law.

## Conclusion

The Court held that *Avena* and the presidential memorandum did not supply enforceable federal law requiring Texas courts to reopen Medellín’s case, because the relevant treaty obligations were non-self-executing and Congress had not implemented them, and the President could not impose compliance on state courts without legislative authority.


Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)