Facts
- Willard Elmer signed a writing promising Josephine L. Moore, a clairvoyant, the balance and interest of a described mortgage note if he died before January 31, 1900.
- The writing recited as consideration prior “business and test sittings” Moore had given Elmer on numerous occasions.
- Moore alleged the sittings were provided at Elmer’s request and required substantial time and labor.
- The writing stated Moore predicted Elmer would die before 1900, a prediction Elmer stated he “strongly doubt[ed],” and framed the promise as recompense only if the prediction proved correct.
- Elmer died before 1900.
- Moore filed a bill in equity against Elmer’s estate administrators to enforce the promise; the administrators demurred.
Issues
- Whether prior “business and test sittings” provided before the writing constituted valid consideration for Elmer’s later conditional promise.
- Whether, even if supported by consideration, the agreement was unenforceable as a wager contingent on Elmer’s death before 1900.
Decision
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill.
- The court held the writing was unsupported by legal consideration because the alleged services were past and no prior obligation to pay was pleaded.
- The court suggested that, if supported by consideration, the agreement would likely be characterized as a wager, but it did not decide the case on that ground.
Legal Principles
- Past services generally do not constitute consideration for a later promise unless the services were rendered under an understanding (express or implied) that payment was due.
- A plaintiff relying on prior services as consideration must plead facts showing a preexisting legal liability to pay, or that the later promise was taken in satisfaction (even conditionally) of that liability.
- Authorities allowing “services rendered upon request” to support a later promise are limited to situations where the request implies an undertaking to pay; a mere requested favor cannot be converted into consideration by a subsequent promise.
Conclusion
Because the pleadings did not allege that Elmer owed Moore a legally enforceable obligation for the prior sittings or that the later writing satisfied any such obligation, the court treated the promise as gratuitous and unenforceable, and it affirmed dismissal on demurrer.