## Facts

- The United States operated an Air Force bombing range in Michigan where spent simulated bomb casings were collected and dumped into piles and left for years, rusting in the open.
- The area had warning signs but was commonly used for deer hunting.
- In December 1948, Morissette, a junk dealer, entered the area while hunting and took about three tons of spent casings in daylight.
- He transported the casings to a farm, flattened them with a tractor, and sold them as scrap for $84.
- Morissette voluntarily told investigators he believed the casings were abandoned and that he had no intent to steal.
- The government charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 641 with unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly stealing and converting government property.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 641 requires proof of criminal intent for “steals” or “knowingly converts” government property despite the statute’s silence on intent.
2. Whether a trial court may instruct that intent is presumed from an intentional taking, effectively removing mens rea from the jury’s consideration.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
- The Court held that criminal intent is an essential element of theft-type offenses prosecuted under § 641.
- The Court held that intent, when an element, is a factual question for the jury based on all relevant evidence.
- The Court held the trial instructions improperly treated intent as established by the act of taking and prevented the jury from deciding whether Morissette honestly believed the property was abandoned.

## Legal Principles

- When Congress uses terms that codify traditional theft offenses (e.g., “steals,” “purloins,” “knowingly converts”), courts presume a mens rea requirement absent a clear statement to dispense with it.
- Statutory silence on intent does not, by itself, create strict liability for traditional common-law crimes.
- Strict-liability treatment is more plausibly limited to regulatory “public welfare” offenses, not ordinary theft-type crimes.
- If mens rea is an element, the judge may not direct a finding or create a legal presumption that establishes intent from the act alone; the jury must determine intent in light of all the circumstances, including a claim of mistake (such as belief in abandonment).

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 641 incorporates a requirement of criminal intent for theft-like conduct and that a defendant’s state of mind must be decided by the jury rather than presumed from the intentional act of taking, requiring reversal where the jury was not allowed to evaluate an honest-belief defense.


Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)