Facts
- The United States operated an Air Force bombing range in Michigan where spent simulated bomb casings were collected and dumped into piles and left for years, rusting in the open.
- The area had warning signs but was commonly used for deer hunting.
- In December 1948, Morissette, a junk dealer, entered the area while hunting and took about three tons of spent casings in daylight.
- He transported the casings to a farm, flattened them with a tractor, and sold them as scrap for $84.
- Morissette voluntarily told investigators he believed the casings were abandoned and that he had no intent to steal.
- The government charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 641 with unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly stealing and converting government property.
Issues
- Whether 18 U.S.C. § 641 requires proof of criminal intent for “steals” or “knowingly converts” government property despite the statute’s silence on intent.
- Whether a trial court may instruct that intent is presumed from an intentional taking, effectively removing mens rea from the jury’s consideration.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
- The Court held that criminal intent is an essential element of theft-type offenses prosecuted under § 641.
- The Court held that intent, when an element, is a factual question for the jury based on all relevant evidence.
- The Court held the trial instructions improperly treated intent as established by the act of taking and prevented the jury from deciding whether Morissette honestly believed the property was abandoned.
Legal Principles
- When Congress uses terms that codify traditional theft offenses (e.g., “steals,” “purloins,” “knowingly converts”), courts presume a mens rea requirement absent a clear statement to dispense with it.
- Statutory silence on intent does not, by itself, create strict liability for traditional common-law crimes.
- Strict-liability treatment is more plausibly limited to regulatory “public welfare” offenses, not ordinary theft-type crimes.
- If mens rea is an element, the judge may not direct a finding or create a legal presumption that establishes intent from the act alone; the jury must determine intent in light of all the circumstances, including a claim of mistake (such as belief in abandonment).
Conclusion
The Court held that § 641 incorporates a requirement of criminal intent for theft-like conduct and that a defendant’s state of mind must be decided by the jury rather than presumed from the intentional act of taking, requiring reversal where the jury was not allowed to evaluate an honest-belief defense.