Facts
- Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. sued Murphy Brothers, Inc. in Alabama state court for breach of contract and fraud.
- Before formally serving Murphy, Michetti faxed a file-stamped “courtesy copy” of the complaint to a Murphy vice president.
- Murphy was later formally served by certified mail under local law.
- Murphy filed a notice of removal to federal court within 30 days of formal service, but more than 30 days after receiving the fax.
- Michetti sought remand, arguing the 30-day removal period in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) began when Murphy received the faxed copy of the complaint.
Issues
- Whether the 30-day removal period in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is triggered by a defendant’s mere receipt of a complaint before formal service of process.
- Whether § 1446(b)’s phrase “receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading” starts the removal clock upon informal transmission by the plaintiff.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held Murphy’s removal was timely.
- The Court held the removal clock is triggered by service of summons and complaint, or by receipt of the complaint after service (or an equivalent authority-asserting measure), but not by mere informal receipt of the complaint without formal service.
- The Court reinstated the district court’s denial of remand.
Legal Principles
- A named defendant is not required to take action in litigation until formally brought under the court’s authority by service of process (or waiver of service).
- Under § 1446(b), the 30-day removal period does not begin upon informal delivery of the complaint unaccompanied by service.
- The phrase “through service or otherwise” extends the trigger beyond simultaneous service of summons and complaint to certain service-linked scenarios (e.g., complaint received after summons, or complaint made available through a court-authorized process), not to a plaintiff’s informal “courtesy copy.”
Conclusion
The Court held that § 1446(b)’s 30-day deadline for removal is not triggered by a defendant’s pre-service receipt of a complaint; it begins only when the defendant is formally notified through service (or a functionally equivalent, authority-asserting step), preserving service of process as the event that imposes procedural obligations.