Myhaver v. Knutson, 189 Ariz. 286, 942 P.2d 445 (Ariz. 1997)

Facts

  • Elmo Knutson drove north on 43rd Avenue near Bell Road in Phoenix.
  • Theresa Magnusson entered from a shopping center driveway and proceeded south in Knutson’s northbound lane, creating an apparent imminent head-on collision.
  • Knutson accelerated and swerved left across a double yellow line into the oncoming lane and collided with Bruce Myhaver’s pickup.
  • Magnusson continued driving until stopped by an officer and returned to the scene.
  • Bruce Myhaver suffered serious injuries; Bruce and Barbara Myhaver sued Knutson and Magnusson for damages.
  • Magnusson settled and was designated a nonparty at fault; the case went to trial against Knutson only.

Issues

  1. In a comparative-fault system, when (if ever) is a “sudden emergency” jury instruction proper in a negligence case?
  2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by giving a sudden-emergency instruction where a driver swerved into oncoming traffic to avoid a perceived head-on collision caused by a third party?

Decision

  • The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Knutson.
  • The court held that a sudden-emergency instruction is not categorically improper after adoption of comparative fault, but its use should be limited and disfavored.
  • The court concluded the trial judge did not abuse discretion in giving the instruction on these facts, where the evidence supported a true, unexpected emergency and a split-second response without proof of antecedent negligence by Knutson.
  • The existence of an emergency is a circumstance within the ordinary reasonable-care inquiry; the reasonable-person standard already accounts for conditions requiring immediate action.
  • A sudden-emergency instruction may be permitted in limited cases to assist the jury in evaluating essentially reflexive conduct during a true emergency.
  • The instruction should be used sparingly and not for routine traffic hazards or where it would overemphasize one party’s evidence.
  • The instruction is generally inappropriate if the defendant’s antecedent negligence contributed to creating the emergency.
  • Whether to give the instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion; it may be given when the record supports an unexpected event not of the defendant’s making, requiring immediate action.

Conclusion

The court preserved but narrowed the sudden-emergency instruction, holding it may be given only in exceptional circumstances to clarify the reasonableness analysis; because a wrong-way driver created an unexpected peril and Knutson’s split-second reaction was not preceded by negligence, the instruction and defense verdict were upheld.