## Facts

- New York Central, an interstate railroad common carrier, participated in shipping sugar from New York City to Detroit under published through tariff rates.
- Federal prosecutors alleged that New York Central’s traffic managers made an unlawful arrangement with the American Sugar Refining Company and related consignees to pay secret rebates that reduced transportation charges below filed rates.
- For April–May 1904 shipments at a lawful rate of 23 cents per 100 pounds, New York Central allegedly refunded 5 cents per 100 pounds; a rebate claim totaling $1,524.99 was presented and later paid through an agent for the shippers’ benefit.
- For June 1904 shipments at a lawful rate of 21 cents per 100 pounds, New York Central allegedly paid rebates of 3 cents per 100 pounds.
- New York Central and an assistant traffic manager, Fred L. Pomeroy, were indicted under the Elkins Act for paying rebates; the case proceeded to the jury on counts charging payment of rebates.
- The corporation and Pomeroy were convicted; the corporation sought Supreme Court review, challenging the statute’s constitutionality as applied to corporate liability and joinder of defendants.

## Issues

1. Whether Congress may constitutionally impose criminal liability on a corporation for statutory offenses committed by its agents acting within the scope of their authority.
2. Whether the Elkins Act’s structure raised due process or presumption-of-innocence objections that could invalidate the corporation’s conviction.
3. Whether it was improper to indict the corporation and its agent together for the same rebate offenses.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
- Congress may impose criminal liability on corporations for certain offenses committed by their agents within the scope of employment, and may treat the agent’s acts as the corporation’s acts for those offenses.
- The Elkins Act was constitutional as applied to corporations punishing rebate payments that resulted in transportation at less than the filed rate.
- A corporation could not invalidate its conviction by asserting constitutional objections framed as protections belonging to individuals; in any event, the statute was valid and severable as to corporations.
- There was no misjoinder in charging the corporation and its agent in one indictment because the statute contemplated liability for both.

## Legal Principles

- A corporation may be criminally liable for statutory violations committed by its agents acting within the scope of their authority and in furtherance of corporate business.
- For regulatory offenses prohibiting specific conduct (such as rebates from filed rates), Congress may attribute an agent’s knowledge and acts to the corporate principal.
- Corporate incapacity to commit some inherently personal crimes does not bar corporate prosecution for statutory offenses consisting of prohibited business conduct.
- A defendant corporation generally cannot rely on constitutional arguments premised on protections asserted as personal to individuals to defeat a corporate conviction; statutory provisions may remain enforceable against corporations even if disputed as to individuals.
- When a statute targets both corporate carriers and responsible agents, joint indictment of the corporation and agent for the same conduct is permissible.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld the Elkins Act’s imposition of criminal penalties on a railroad corporation for rebate payments made through its managers, confirming that federal law may treat an agent’s conduct within assigned authority as the corporation’s conduct and may prosecute both corporation and agent together for rate-discrimination offenses.


N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909)