## Facts

- Robert Nelson Atkins told friends he hated Orville Figgs and said he would burn down Figgs’s house.
- The next day, Atkins and his brother drove by Figgs’s home; later that afternoon they went into a nearby canyon and drank alcohol.
- A neighbor saw the brother’s white pickup enter the canyon and later leave quickly; about thirty minutes later a fire was reported.
- A fire marshal observed extreme fire conditions, including dry vegetation and strong winds; the fire burned for three days and spread several miles.
- The origin area smelled of a gasoline/oil mixture, soil tests were positive for gasoline, and Atkins’s wallet was found nearby.
- Atkins admitted using gasoline to ignite weeds in the canyon; the fire spread rapidly, they failed to put it out, panicked, and left.
- Atkins claimed he did not intend harm and that the event was an accident influenced by voluntary intoxication.

## Issues

1. Whether arson under California Penal Code § 451 is a general intent or specific intent crime for purposes of Penal Code § 22.
2. Whether evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to show the defendant did not form the mental state required for arson.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and reinstated the arson conviction.
- The court held that arson under Penal Code § 451 is a general intent offense.
- Because arson is general intent, Penal Code § 22 does not permit voluntary intoxication evidence to negate the required mental state.
- The trial court therefore properly instructed that voluntary intoxication was not a defense to arson or its lesser included offenses.

## Legal Principles

- A general intent crime requires only an intent to do the prohibited act; a specific intent crime requires an additional intent to achieve a further act or consequence.
- Penal Code § 451’s requirement that the burning be done “willfully and maliciously” describes culpability accompanying the act of setting a fire, not an additional objective beyond the burning.
- Under Penal Code § 22, voluntary intoxication evidence is admissible only to negate a statutorily required specific intent (and other limited mental states specified by statute), not general intent.
- Arson’s traditional treatment as a general intent offense supports excluding voluntary intoxication evidence offered to negate its mental element.

## Conclusion

Arson of forest land under Penal Code § 451 is a general intent offense requiring proof that the defendant willfully and maliciously set a fire, and voluntary intoxication evidence is not admissible under Penal Code § 22 to negate that mental state.


People v. Atkins, 25 Cal. 4th 76 (Cal. 2001)