## Facts

- Julius Lamar Cox was prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter under Penal Code § 192(b) on a misdemeanor-manslaughter theory, with simple battery (Pen. Code § 242) as the predicate misdemeanor.
- In the early morning of August 22, 1996, after alcohol use and crack cocaine smoking, Evelonia Hunter and Duane Spann encountered Cox and Steve Vickers outside a Pomona motel where Hunter had a room.
- Hunter and Vickers argued; Vickers spit in Hunter’s face and slapped Spann with an open hand.
- Approximately a minute later, Cox punched Spann with a solid blow to the right side of his head; Spann had not struck Cox or Vickers.
- Spann fell, lost consciousness, and later died from a fractured skull and related brain injury.
- The trial court instructed the jury in a manner that treated battery as a sufficiently dangerous predicate for § 192(b) without requiring a jury finding that the battery was dangerous under the circumstances of its commission.

## Issues

1. Whether involuntary manslaughter under Penal Code § 192(b) predicated on “an unlawful act, not amounting to felony” requires proof that the predicate misdemeanor was dangerous under the circumstances of its commission.
2. Whether it was error to instruct the jury that misdemeanor battery was a sufficient predicate as a matter of law, without submitting the dangerousness-as-committed determination to the jury.
3. Whether prior precedent eliminated any “dangerousness under the circumstances” requirement for misdemeanor-manslaughter where the predicate misdemeanor is a general-intent offense.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment affirming the conviction.
- The Court held that misdemeanor-based involuntary manslaughter under § 192(b) requires proof that the predicate misdemeanor was dangerous under the circumstances of its commission.
- The Court rejected the interpretation that commission of any general-intent misdemeanor alone suffices for § 192(b) misdemeanor-manslaughter.
- The Court held the jury instruction was erroneous because it removed from the jury the need to find dangerousness under the actual circumstances.
- The matter was remanded for the Court of Appeal to determine whether the instructional error was prejudicial on the evidence presented.

## Legal Principles

- Under Penal Code § 192(b), a killing in the commission of “an unlawful act, not amounting to felony” constitutes involuntary manslaughter only if the predicate misdemeanor is dangerous under the circumstances of its commission.
- The relevant inquiry is contextual dangerousness (dangerous as committed), not whether the misdemeanor is inherently dangerous in the abstract.
- A trial court may not treat the predicate misdemeanor as a per se adequate basis for misdemeanor-manslaughter where doing so relieves the prosecution of proving, and the jury of finding, the dangerousness element.
- Misreading precedent to permit “any misdemeanor” as a predicate offense is error; the doctrine excludes trivial or non-dangerous misdemeanors lacking a substantial risk of serious harm in the manner committed.

## Conclusion

The California Supreme Court held that involuntary manslaughter under Penal Code § 192(b) predicated on a misdemeanor requires a jury finding that the misdemeanor was dangerous under the circumstances of its commission, and it reversed and remanded for a prejudice determination because the instructions treated battery as sufficient without that required finding.


People v. Cox, 23 Cal. 4th 665, 2 P.3d 1189 (Cal. 2000)