## Facts

- James W. Foster approached John Ragsdale in a bar and suggested “making some money” by robbing an elderly man believed to keep valuables.
- The next day, Foster discussed details of the planned robbery with Ragsdale.
- Ragsdale decided to feign agreement to gather information, but he did not intend to participate in the robbery.
- Foster later went to Ragsdale’s home to see if he was “ready to go”; Ragsdale attempted to delay by saying he needed to find another person to help.
- Ragsdale informed police of the plan, and police later arrested Foster and Ragsdale when they arrived at the intended victim’s residence.
- A jury convicted Foster of conspiracy to commit robbery under Illinois law; the appellate court reversed, concluding no conspiracy existed because Ragsdale never truly agreed.

## Issues

1. Whether Illinois’s conspiracy statute requires a bilateral agreement (a true agreement of at least two persons) or permits a unilateral theory (conviction when the supposed co-conspirator only feigns agreement).
2. Whether a conspiracy conviction can stand when the only alleged co-conspirator subjectively lacked intent to join the criminal plan.

## Decision

- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of Foster’s conspiracy conviction.
- The court held the Illinois conspiracy statute requires an actual agreement of at least two persons.
- Because Ragsdale only feigned agreement and never intended to participate, no conspiratorial agreement existed as a matter of law.

## Legal Principles

- Under Illinois law, conspiracy requires a true agreement between at least two persons who each intend to commit the offense; apparent assent by an informant or decoy is insufficient.
- Absent clear statutory language adopting unilateral conspiracy, courts presume the legislature retained the traditional bilateral requirement.
- Ambiguities in penal statutes are construed in favor of the accused, supporting rejection of unilateral conspiracy when legislative intent is unclear.
- Prior judicial constructions of a statute, coupled with legislative inaction, may support the inference that the legislature accepted the established interpretation.

## Conclusion

Illinois’s conspiracy statute imposes a bilateral agreement requirement, so a defendant cannot be convicted of conspiracy when the only alleged partner merely pretended to agree and lacked intent to join the criminal objective.


People v. Foster, 99 Ill. 2d 48, 457 N.E.2d 405 (Ill. 1983)