## Facts

- Around 2:00 a.m. on September 11, 1967, David Keith Hood, his brother, and a friend had been drinking heavily for several hours.
- The group went to the home of Hood’s former girlfriend, Susan Bueno, and asked to use the bathroom; when refused, Hood forced entry and beat her.
- A neighbor called police after hearing screams; Officers Alfred Elia and Donald Kemper responded.
- Susan, crying, indicated Hood and the others were in the kitchen; the officers entered.
- Hood challenged Elia’s authority and used obscenities; Elia attempted to arrest Hood.
- A struggle followed; Hood fought with Elia while Hood’s brother engaged Officer Kemper.
- During the struggle, Hood seized Elia’s gun and shot Elia in the legs.
- Hood was indicted for (1) assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer (Penal Code § 245(b)), (2) battery on a peace officer (Penal Code §§ 242–243), and (3) assault with intent to murder (Penal Code § 217).
- A jury convicted Hood on counts (1) and (3) and acquitted him on count (2); the trial court imposed sentence on count (3) only, withholding sentence on count (1) unless count (3) was not carried out.
- On appeal, Hood challenged the intoxication instructions and the failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses.

## Issues

1. Whether assault with a deadly weapon under Penal Code § 245 is a specific-intent offense allowing voluntary intoxication to negate mens rea, or a general-intent offense for which intoxication is not a defense.
2. Whether the trial court committed prejudicial instructional error by giving confusing intoxication instructions across multiple charges and by failing to instruct on lesser-included offenses supported by the evidence.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held assault with a deadly weapon under Penal Code § 245 is a general-intent crime; voluntary intoxication does not negate the mental element of assault.
- The court held assault with intent to murder under Penal Code § 217 is a specific-intent offense; voluntary intoxication may be considered on whether the defendant formed intent to kill.
- The court found the instructions on intoxication and intent were inconsistent and failed to clearly separate the offenses for which intoxication was relevant from those for which it was not.
- The court concluded the instructional confusion was prejudicial given substantial evidence of intoxication bearing on intent to murder.
- The court also concluded the trial court should have instructed on lesser-included offenses where supported by the evidence, including a lesser assault offense not requiring the “peace officer in performance of duties” element.

## Legal Principles

- Assault, including assault with a deadly weapon under Penal Code § 245, is a general-intent crime; the prosecution need not prove a further purpose beyond the assaultive act, and voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the assault element.
- Crimes requiring an additional, further mental state beyond the assaultive act—such as intent to kill in assault with intent to murder under Penal Code § 217—are specific-intent offenses; voluntary intoxication evidence may be considered on whether that specific intent was formed.
- When multiple charged offenses differ in the relevance of intoxication (general-intent versus specific-intent), the court must instruct in a way that clearly identifies which counts permit consideration of intoxication and which do not; internally inconsistent instructions constitute error.
- A trial court must instruct sua sponte on lesser-included offenses that are supported by substantial evidence and are closely connected to the facts, even absent a request, to ensure the jury can resolve material factual disputes reflected in the evidence.
- Where an aggravated form of assault depends on an additional element relating to a peace officer’s status and performance of duties, and the evidence raises a factual question on that element, the jury must be given the option of a supported lesser offense that omits the disputed element.

## Conclusion

The court reversed because assault under Penal Code § 245 is a general-intent offense unaffected by voluntary intoxication, while assault with intent to murder requires specific intent that intoxication may negate; the trial court’s conflicting instructions and failure to instruct on supported lesser-included offenses created prejudicial error requiring a new trial.


People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1969)