## Facts

- Robert Kelley had a history of heavy drinking and later being unable to remember what he had done while intoxicated.
- Kelley had previously committed an armed robbery after drinking, but in that earlier episode he was still sober enough to realize what he was doing.
- On the occasion at issue, Kelley drank heavily for an extended period and eventually “blacked out,” meaning he stopped realizing or remembering what he was doing.
- During this period of extreme intoxication, Kelley and another man committed an armed robbery.
- At trial, Kelley relied on voluntary intoxication to argue he lacked the specific intent required for armed robbery because he was not conscious of his actions at the time.
- The trial court instructed the jury that if Kelley’s intoxication prevented him from being conscious of what he was doing, then he could not be guilty of the specific-intent crime of armed robbery—unless, before he started drinking, Kelley knew that drinking might cause him to lose control and commit a crime.
- The jury convicted Kelley of armed robbery.
- Kelley appealed, arguing that the instruction allowed the jury to find the required specific intent based only on his prior general awareness that heavy drinking might lead him to commit “some crime.”

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by instructing that a defendant who is so intoxicated that he is not conscious of his actions may still be found to have the specific intent for armed robbery if, before drinking, he knew drinking might cause him to lose control and commit a crime.
2. Whether that erroneous instruction required reversal of the armed-robbery conviction.

## Decision

- The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed Kelley’s armed-robbery conviction.
- The court held the intoxication instruction misstated the law by permitting a finding of the specific intent to commit armed robbery based on pre-drinking knowledge that intoxication might lead to criminal conduct.
- The case was returned for further proceedings consistent with a correct instruction on voluntary intoxication and specific intent.

## Legal Principles

- Armed robbery is a specific-intent offense; the prosecution must prove the defendant formed the required intent at the time of the offense.
- In a specific-intent prosecution, evidence of voluntary intoxication may be considered on whether the defendant actually formed the required specific intent.
- A jury may not be instructed that a defendant’s prior decision to drink—combined with prior awareness that intoxication might cause loss of control and wrongdoing—can substitute for proof that the defendant formed the particular intent to commit the charged crime.
- When the defense theory is blackout-level intoxication, the legal question for the jury remains whether the defendant, at the time of the robbery, was capable of and did form the intent required for armed robbery; generalized foreseeability that drinking may lead to crime does not itself establish that intent.

## Conclusion

Because the jury was told it could find the specific intent for armed robbery even if Kelley was not conscious of his conduct, so long as he previously knew heavy drinking might make him lose control and commit a crime, the instruction allowed conviction without proof of contemporaneous, offense-specific intent; the conviction was therefore reversed.


People v. Kelley, 176 N.W.2d 435 (1970)