Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L. Ed. 2d 594 (2019)

Facts

  • Hamid Rehaif entered the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa to attend a university.
  • Rehaif was dismissed from the university for poor grades.
  • The university informed Rehaif that his lawful immigration status would end unless he enrolled at another school or left the United States.
  • Rehaif did not enroll elsewhere and did not leave the country.
  • The government later learned that Rehaif shot two firearms at a firing range.
  • Federal prosecutors charged Rehaif with possessing firearms as a person “illegally or unlawfully in the United States,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), with penalties sought under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
  • Rehaif argued that the government had to prove he knew both that he possessed a firearm and that he was unlawfully in the country.
  • Over Rehaif’s objection, the trial judge instructed the jury that the government did not have to prove Rehaif knew he was unlawfully in the United States, only that he knowingly possessed a firearm.
  • The jury convicted Rehaif, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction.
  • The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether knowledge of status is required under §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2).

Issues

  1. In a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2), must the government prove the defendant knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm (here, that he knew he was unlawfully in the United States), as well as that he knowingly possessed a firearm?

Decision

  • Yes. The Supreme Court held that, in prosecutions under § 922(g) with penalties under § 924(a)(2), the government must prove the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had the relevant prohibited status when he possessed it.
  • The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
  • The Court read § 924(a)(2)’s “knowingly violates” language to require knowledge of the elements that make the conduct a violation of § 922(g), including the defendant’s status (though not the commerce/jurisdiction element).
  • The Court relied on the general interpretive rule that Congress ordinarily intends a mens rea requirement to apply to each element that makes otherwise lawful conduct criminal, absent clear statutory language to the contrary.
  • In a § 922(g) prosecution punished under § 924(a)(2), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew (1) he possessed a firearm (or ammunition) and (2) he belonged to the relevant prohibited status category at the time of possession.
  • The word “knowingly” in § 924(a)(2) is ordinarily read to apply to the elements that define the prohibited conduct in § 922(g), including the status element.
  • The status-knowledge requirement does not extend to § 922(g)’s commerce-related jurisdiction element.
  • Knowledge of prohibited status may be proven through direct or circumstantial evidence, depending on the facts of the case.

Conclusion

Rehaif holds that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) carrying punishment under § 924(a)(2) requires proof the defendant knew he possessed a firearm (or ammunition) and knew he was in the prohibited status category that made that possession unlawful; convictions based on jury instructions that removed the status-knowledge element cannot stand under that interpretation.