Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal. 2d 94, 331 P.2d 48 (Cal. 1958)

Facts

  • A two-year-and-three-month-old child, Keith Reynolds, lived near the defendants, Melville and Rayona Willson, in a Fresno residential area with many children.
  • The Willsons had a backyard swimming pool (about 20×40 feet) with depth sloping from roughly 3 feet to over 9 feet; the shallow end and steps were closer to the street side.
  • A stucco wall largely enclosed the Willsons’ property, but there was a roughly 10.5-foot opening near the garage facing the street; there were bolts but no gate.
  • The street was lightly trafficked and commonly used by neighborhood children for play; the pool was visible through the open wall opening.
  • During winter, the pool was left partially filled; accumulated debris and algae made the bottom slippery.
  • The child had previously been at the pool with neighbors; on at least one prior occasion, he approached alone and was sent home by Mrs. Willson.
  • On January 31, 1953, the child entered through the opening, was found face-down in the pool, and suffered severe brain injury; the slippery bottom allegedly hindered rescue.
  • Evidence indicated a gate for the wall opening could have been installed for about $25.

Issues

  1. Whether the evidence permitted liability to a trespassing child under Restatement (First) of Torts § 339 for injury caused by an artificial condition (the pool and its condition).
  2. Whether the pool’s accessible, partially filled, slippery condition could support liability under a “trap” or concealed-danger theory.
  3. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).

Decision

  • The California Supreme Court affirmed the order denying JNOV, leaving the plaintiff’s jury verdict in place.
  • The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find defendants liable under Restatement § 339.
  • The evidence also permitted the jury to consider whether the condition constituted a “trap” or concealed danger.
  • Negligence and proximate cause were properly treated as jury questions under the JNOV standard.
  • A land possessor may be liable for physical harm to trespassing children caused by an artificial condition if the elements of Restatement (First) of Torts § 339 are supported by the evidence, including foreseeability of child trespass, unreasonable risk of death or serious harm, and the child’s inability (because of youth) to appreciate the danger.
  • In assessing unreasonable risk and breach, the factfinder may weigh the utility of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger against the magnitude of the risk to children; low-cost precautions can support a finding of unreasonableness in failing to protect against foreseeable harm.
  • On review of a denied JNOV motion, conflicts in evidence and reasonable inferences are resolved in favor of the verdict; if substantial evidence supports the verdict, judgment may not be taken from the jury.

Conclusion

The court held that a jury could reasonably find homeowners liable for a toddler’s near-drowning where a visible, accessible residential pool in a child-populated area was left unguarded through an ungated opening and in a hazardous condition, and where inexpensive precautions could have reduced the risk; denial of JNOV was affirmed.