Facts
- Wilson Ryals, Jr., as administrator of his brother David Ryals’s estate, brought a wrongful-death action against United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel).
- On March 31, 1984, Wilson and David entered U.S. Steel’s Muscoda Mines electrical substation/switch rack area as trespassers to remove and take copper, brass, and other metals.
- The area was fenced, but the gate was open; Wilson testified there was a rusty warning sign, detached metal on the ground, dangling wires, debris, and overgrown vegetation.
- David contacted a 44,000-volt line, suffered severe burns, and died days later.
- The plaintiff alleged U.S. Steel negligently or wantonly failed to maintain and secure the switch rack; the negligence claim was voluntarily dismissed, leaving only wantonness.
- The trial court entered summary judgment for U.S. Steel on wantonness.
Issues
- What duty of care does a landowner owe to a trespasser who enters with the manifest intent to commit a criminal act?
- Under that duty standard, was there evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim that U.S. Steel’s conduct was wanton or otherwise actionable?
Decision
- The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed summary judgment for U.S. Steel.
- The court recognized two categories of trespassers: (1) “mere trespassers,” owed a duty not to be wantonly injured; and (2) trespassers entering with manifest intent to commit a crime, owed only a duty not to be intentionally injured.
- Because David was trespassing to steal U.S. Steel’s property, U.S. Steel owed him only a duty to refrain from intentional injury.
- The record contained no evidence that U.S. Steel acted with intent to injure David; therefore, U.S. Steel was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56.
Legal Principles
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Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; identifying the applicable duty is antecedent to evaluating liability.
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Alabama premises-liability law distinguishes between:
- Mere trespassers, to whom the landowner owes a duty not to wantonly injure; and
- Trespassers entering with manifest intent to commit a criminal act, to whom the landowner owes only a duty not to intentionally injure.
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Evidence of poor maintenance, inadequate security, or an open gate at a dangerous industrial site may be insufficient as a matter of law when the only actionable duty is avoidance of intentional harm.
Conclusion
The court held that a landowner’s duty to a trespasser engaged in theft is limited to refraining from intentional injury, and because no evidence supported an intent to harm, summary judgment for the landowner was affirmed.