Ries Biologicals, Inc. v. Bank of Santa Fe, 780 F.2d 888 (1986)

Facts

  • Ries Biologicals, Inc. (Ries) regularly sold medical supplies to Dialysis Management Systems, Inc. (DMS).
  • DMS developed financial problems and fell behind on payments, owing Ries about $42,000.
  • In January 1980, Ries stopped extending credit and refused further shipments except on a cash-on-delivery basis.
  • Ries later resumed credit shipments after the Bank of Santa Fe (Bank) allegedly, through its senior vice president, Philip Levitt, orally agreed to guarantee payment for DMS purchases that Levitt approved in advance.
  • Under the arrangement found by the trial court, DMS orders were cleared with Levitt before shipment, and Ries sent invoices for those shipments directly to Levitt at the Bank.
  • Ries shipped supplies from the time of the agreement through July 30, 1980, but was not fully paid for the materials shipped under the approval-and-invoicing practice.
  • Ries sued the Bank in federal district court and offered evidence of Levitt’s oral guarantee and related documents; the trial court admitted the evidence over the Bank’s objections.
  • After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Ries for $20,276.69 plus interest, costs, and attorney’s fees, treating the running balance as an “open account” under New Mexico law.
  • The Bank appealed to the Tenth Circuit.

Issues

  1. Whether the Bank’s alleged oral promise to pay for DMS’s approved orders was barred by the statute of frauds as a promise to answer for the debt of another.
  2. Whether the district court properly treated the course of dealings as an “open account” under New Mexico law, supporting an award of attorney’s fees.
  3. Whether Levitt’s alleged guarantee was unenforceable because it was beyond the Bank’s powers or beyond Levitt’s authority (ultra vires/authority challenge).
  4. Whether testimony and documents describing the guarantee were inadmissible hearsay.
  5. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Ries proved shipment, delivery, and acceptance of the goods tied to the unpaid balance.

Decision

  • The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for Ries.
  • The court rejected the statute of frauds defense, concluding the oral promise could be enforced under New Mexico’s “main purpose” (or “leading object”) doctrine where the Bank’s own financial interest was served and Ries performed by shipping goods in reliance on the promise.
  • The court upheld the district court’s finding that the transactions constituted an open account under New Mexico law and affirmed the attorney’s-fee award.
  • The court rejected the Bank’s ultra vires/authority arguments, holding the evidence supported the finding that Levitt, as senior vice president acting within the Bank’s course of dealing, could bind the Bank (at least by apparent authority).
  • The court held the challenged proof of the oral guarantee was properly admitted, including as non-hearsay party-opponent admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), and also because some documents were offered to show the existence of the arrangement rather than the truth of each statement in them.
  • Applying deferential review to fact findings after a bench trial, the court concluded the record supported the findings that the goods were shipped and accepted and that the unpaid balance was owed under the arrangement.
  • A promise that appears to answer for another’s debt may fall outside the statute of frauds when the promisor’s primary object is to serve its own pecuniary interest (the “main purpose”/“leading object” doctrine), making the undertaking effectively original rather than collateral.
  • When a seller ships goods in reliance on an oral payment undertaking, the seller’s performance may support enforcement where state law recognizes an exception to the statute of frauds in these circumstances.
  • Statements by an agent concerning matters within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the relationship, are admissible against the principal as non-hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D).
  • A bank may be bound by commitments made through an officer who is placed in a position of responsibility and who conducts the relevant transactions in a way that conveys authority to third parties (including apparent authority shown by the bank’s course of dealing).
  • On appeal from a bench trial, the reviewing court will not overturn factual findings on matters such as reliance, delivery, and acceptance unless they are clearly erroneous.
  • A continuing series of credit transactions reflected in a running balance may be treated as an open account under New Mexico law, allowing recovery of attorney’s fees where the statute applies.

Conclusion

Ries resumed shipping medical supplies to DMS on credit after relying on the Bank’s senior vice president’s oral agreement to guarantee payment for orders he approved and invoiced through the Bank; when the Bank did not pay the remaining balance, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for Ries, holding the statute of frauds did not bar enforcement under the main-purpose doctrine, the evidence of the agreement was properly admitted (including under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)), the officer’s authority arguments failed, the open-account fee award was proper, and the trial court’s delivery and acceptance findings were not clearly erroneous.