## Facts

- Patricia Rossi, age eight, lived with her parents in Methuen, Massachusetts.
- Ernest V. DelDuca owned two Great Dane dogs and possessed an open field behind his residence used in connection with his business operations; the field was owned by his father but treated as in DelDuca’s possession.
- While walking home on a public street, Patricia was frightened by a dog that came between her and her home and followed her.
- To get home, Patricia ran down a dead-end street and into the open field.
- In the field, DelDuca’s two Great Danes attacked Patricia and caused serious injuries.
- Patricia (through a next friend) sued for personal injuries, and her father, John Rossi, sued for medical expenses he incurred for her treatment.
- The actions were brought under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 140, § 155, which imposes liability on a dog’s owner or keeper unless the injured person was committing a trespass or other tort, or teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence required a directed verdict for the dog owner because the child was “committing a trespass” under G.L. c. 140, § 155 when she entered the field and was attacked.
2. Whether a parent of a minor child injured by a dog may recover consequential damages (including medical expenses) under G.L. c. 140, § 155.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court overruled the defendant’s exceptions to the denial of directed verdict motions and left the plaintiffs’ jury verdicts undisturbed.
- The court held the child was not “committing a trespass” within the meaning of § 155 when she entered the field to escape a threatening situation and reach home.
- The court held a parent may recover consequential damages incurred because of a minor child’s dog-inflicted injuries under § 155.

## Legal Principles

- G.L. c. 140, § 155 imposes statutory liability on a dog’s owner or keeper for damage to body or property without requiring proof of negligence or knowledge of dangerous propensities, subject to specified defenses.
- The statutory bar for injury “occasioned” while the injured person was “committing a trespass or other tort” is construed in context; emergency-driven entry onto land to avoid danger and reach safety need not constitute “committing a trespass” for purposes of § 155.
- In actions under § 155, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the injury was not sustained while committing a trespass or other tort and was not caused while teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog.
- “Such damage” under § 155 includes consequential damages proximately resulting from the dog’s injury to a minor, including a parent’s medical expenses.

## Conclusion

The court applied § 155’s strict-liability scheme to permit recovery where an eight-year-old entered a field to avoid a threatening situation and get home, holding that this conduct was not “committing a trespass” under the statute and that the child’s parent could also recover consequential medical expenses.


Rossi v. DelDuca, 344 Mass. 66, 181 N.E.2d 591 (Mass. 1962)