## Facts

- Congress enacted 39 U.S.C. § 4009, permitting a householder to request a prohibitory order against a sender of “pandering advertisements” the addressee, in the addressee’s sole discretion, believed to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative.
- Upon the addressee’s request, the Postmaster General was to issue an order directing the sender and agents to stop further mailings to the named addressee, delete the addressee from mailing lists, and refrain from trading in lists that had not been corrected.
- If a violation was suspected, the statute required notice to the sender, reasons, an opportunity to respond, and an administrative hearing; after a violation finding, the Postmaster General could ask the Attorney General to seek a district court order compelling compliance.
- Mail-order advertisers and related businesses challenged § 4009 as violating the First Amendment and due process.
- A three-judge federal district court upheld the statute, construing it to allow the addressee to bar not only the initial type of advertisement but also similar future advertisements from the same sender.
- The Supreme Court took the case on direct appeal.

## Issues

1. Whether § 4009 violates the First Amendment by allowing an addressee to block future mailings from a particular sender.
2. Whether § 4009 violates due process because it is vague or because it provides inadequate procedures for mailers subject to a prohibitory order.
3. Whether a prohibitory order may extend beyond the specific mailing that triggered the addressee’s request to additional similar mail from the same sender.

## Decision

- The Court affirmed the judgment upholding § 4009.
- The Court held that a mailer has no constitutional entitlement to send unwanted material into a person’s home; the sender’s ability to communicate stops at an unreceptive addressee’s mailbox.
- The Court held that the statute places the decisive choice with the addressee, not the government, and therefore does not operate as governmental censorship of content.
- The Court approved construing the statute to permit an addressee to bar further mail from the same sender, without requiring the addressee to continue screening future mailings for similarity.
- The Court held that the statute provides sufficient procedural protections and is not unconstitutionally vague because, upon receiving an order, the sender is clearly informed of the required compliance steps.

## Legal Principles

- Individuals may refuse further communications directed into their homes; the government may enforce that choice without violating the First Amendment when the restriction is limited to mailings to specific unwilling recipients.
- A speaker’s right to communicate does not include a right to force speech on an unwilling listener in the home; residential privacy may justify targeted limits that leave communication with willing recipients and the public generally unaffected.
- A statutory scheme is consistent with procedural due process when alleged violations trigger notice, reasons, an opportunity to respond, an administrative hearing, and access to judicial enforcement proceedings before coercive orders issue.
- A law is not unconstitutionally vague when regulated parties can determine with clarity what conduct is required or prohibited, including list removal and cessation obligations after receipt of a prohibitory order.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld § 4009 as a constitutional mechanism allowing householders, in their own discretion, to stop further mail from specific senders, concluding that protected residential privacy justifies this addressee-controlled restriction and that the statute’s enforcement procedures and compliance duties satisfy due process.


Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)