## Facts

- Wilson Ryals, Jr., as administrator of his brother David Ryals’s estate, brought a wrongful-death action against United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel).
- On March 31, 1984, Wilson and David entered U.S. Steel’s Muscoda Mines electrical substation/switch rack area as trespassers to remove and take copper, brass, and other metals.
- The area was fenced, but the gate was open; Wilson testified there was a rusty warning sign, detached metal on the ground, dangling wires, debris, and overgrown vegetation.
- David contacted a 44,000-volt line, suffered severe burns, and died days later.
- The plaintiff alleged U.S. Steel negligently or wantonly failed to maintain and secure the switch rack; the negligence claim was voluntarily dismissed, leaving only wantonness.
- The trial court entered summary judgment for U.S. Steel on wantonness.

## Issues

1. What duty of care does a landowner owe to a trespasser who enters with the manifest intent to commit a criminal act?
2. Under that duty standard, was there evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim that U.S. Steel’s conduct was wanton or otherwise actionable?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed summary judgment for U.S. Steel.
- The court recognized two categories of trespassers: (1) “mere trespassers,” owed a duty not to be wantonly injured; and (2) trespassers entering with manifest intent to commit a crime, owed only a duty not to be intentionally injured.
- Because David was trespassing to steal U.S. Steel’s property, U.S. Steel owed him only a duty to refrain from intentional injury.
- The record contained no evidence that U.S. Steel acted with intent to injure David; therefore, U.S. Steel was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; identifying the applicable duty is antecedent to evaluating liability.
- Alabama premises-liability law distinguishes between:
  - Mere trespassers, to whom the landowner owes a duty not to wantonly injure; and
  - Trespassers entering with manifest intent to commit a criminal act, to whom the landowner owes only a duty not to intentionally injure.
- Evidence of poor maintenance, inadequate security, or an open gate at a dangerous industrial site may be insufficient as a matter of law when the only actionable duty is avoidance of intentional harm.

## Conclusion

The court held that a landowner’s duty to a trespasser engaged in theft is limited to refraining from intentional injury, and because no evidence supported an intent to harm, summary judgment for the landowner was affirmed.


Ryals v. United States Steel Corp., 562 So. 2d 192 (Ala. 1990)