## Facts

- Anita Saar, as administratrix of the estate of Elmer Hernits, brought a medical-malpractice/wrongful-death action arising from Hernits’s death by heart attack.
- Saar alleged Hernits would have survived if a bypass operation had been performed, but surgery was not done because Hernits’s medical records were negligently handled.
- Saar sued multiple defendants, including Albany Medical Center (the hospital), Dr. Harry C. Odabashian Jr., and Brown and Odabashian, P.C.
- During pretrial disclosure, Saar served demands under CPLR § 3101(d)(1) seeking identification of defendants’ intended expert trial witnesses and disclosure in reasonable detail of: (1) subject matter, (2) substance of facts and opinions, (3) qualifications, and (4) grounds for each opinion.
- The hospital identified an expert and provided the expert’s qualifications, and stated the expert would testify that: (1) Hernits was clinically stable and did not have an emergency need for a bypass operation, and (2) the hospital acted properly and did not commit malpractice.
- Dr. Odabashian responded that he was not yet able to identify an expert witness but would provide the information before trial.
- Saar moved under CPLR § 3126 to preclude the hospital and Dr. Odabashian (and related defendants) from offering any expert testimony at trial, arguing their CPLR § 3101(d)(1) responses were insufficient.

## Issues

1. Under CPLR § 3101(d)(1), what level of detail must a party provide about an anticipated medical witness’s opinions and bases in response to an expert-disclosure demand?
2. When a party’s CPLR § 3101(d)(1) expert disclosure is incomplete or delayed, does CPLR § 3126 require preclusion of expert testimony, or may the trial court allow testimony if prejudice is not shown (or can be cured)?

## Decision

- The court treated the dispute as a pretrial discovery/sanctions question concerning the adequacy and timing of CPLR § 3101(d)(1) expert disclosure.
- The court declined to apply automatic preclusion as the remedy for claimed shortcomings in expert disclosure.
- The court held that preclusion of expert testimony is a severe sanction and is a matter for the trial court’s discretion under CPLR § 3126, generally turning on whether noncompliance was willful and whether the opponent shows actual prejudice that cannot be remedied through lesser measures.
- Applying that discretionary approach, the court denied Saar’s request to bar defendants from presenting expert testimony based solely on the challenged disclosures and the timing of Dr. Odabashian’s identification of an expert.

## Legal Principles

- CPLR § 3101(d)(1) requires disclosure in reasonable detail of the subject matter of the anticipated testimony, the substance of the facts and opinions, the witness’s qualifications, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
- “Substance” disclosure is meant to provide fair notice of the theory and basis of an anticipated medical witness’s testimony; it is not necessarily a full, report-style recitation of every supporting fact.
- Trial courts have broad authority under CPLR § 3126 to select an appropriate remedy for failures to provide discovery, including ordering additional disclosure, granting time to respond, or (in proper cases) precluding evidence.
- Preclusion is generally reserved for situations involving willful noncompliance and resulting prejudice; where any prejudice can be addressed through additional disclosure or scheduling adjustments, preclusion is not required.

## Conclusion

*Saar v. Brown and Odabashian, P.C.* addresses a medical-malpractice discovery dispute over CPLR § 3101(d)(1) expert disclosure and the requested sanction of preclusion under CPLR § 3126, holding that exclusion of expert testimony is not automatic for incomplete or late disclosure and instead depends on the trial court’s discretion, with close attention to willfulness and prejudice.


Saar v. Brown and Odabashian, P.C., 139 Misc. 2d 328, 527 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1988)