## Facts

- San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFAA), a nonprofit corporation, planned a 1982 multi-sport event called the “Gay Olympic Games.”
- SFAA used “Olympic” on promotional materials and merchandise connected to the event.
- The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) is a congressionally chartered corporation under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978.
- Section 110 of that Act granted the USOC an exclusive statutory right to use “Olympic” and to prohibit certain unauthorized commercial and promotional uses.
- After requesting that SFAA stop using “Olympic,” the USOC sued for injunctive relief when SFAA refused.
- The federal district court granted summary judgment to the USOC and entered a permanent injunction.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the USOC’s statutory right was broader than ordinary trademark protection and that the USOC was not a governmental actor.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

## Issues

1. Whether § 110 granted the USOC only ordinary trademark-like rights (requiring confusion and permitting Lanham Act defenses) or a broader exclusive right.
2. Whether enjoining SFAA’s use of “Olympic” for “Gay Olympic Games” violated the First Amendment.
3. Whether the USOC’s enforcement decisions constituted governmental action triggering the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the injunction for the USOC.
- The Court held that § 110 grants the USOC exclusive control over “Olympic” that is not conditioned on proof of consumer confusion.
- The Court held that § 110’s reference to Lanham Act remedies does not incorporate Lanham Act defenses.
- The Court held that applying § 110 to SFAA’s promotional use of “Olympic” did not violate the First Amendment.
- The Court held that the USOC is not a governmental actor, so constitutional equal protection constraints did not apply to its enforcement choices.

## Legal Principles

- Congress may create a statutory exclusive right in a word or symbol that extends beyond conventional trademark rules, including without requiring proof of likely confusion.
- Statutory incorporation of trademark remedies does not necessarily incorporate trademark defenses when the statute’s text and history show a different enforcement scheme.
- A restriction on the use of a specific term in commercial or promotional contexts may be upheld where it serves a legitimate governmental objective and leaves speakers free to convey their message through other wording.
- A federally chartered corporation with special statutory privileges is not, without governmental control or coercion, a governmental actor for constitutional claims.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld § 110 as granting the USOC a broad, confusion-independent exclusive right to “Olympic,” found no First Amendment violation from enjoining SFAA’s promotional use of the term, and rejected equal protection arguments because the USOC was not a governmental actor.


San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987)