## Facts

- John and Annie Santosky were the natural parents of three children who were placed in foster care after state neglect proceedings.
- The Ulster County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a petition under New York Family Court Act § 622 to terminate the parents’ rights on the ground of “permanent neglect.”
- The statute permitted termination upon proof of permanent neglect by a “fair preponderance of the evidence” at the fact-finding stage, followed by a dispositional determination based on the children’s best interests.
- The Family Court rejected the parents’ constitutional challenge, found permanent neglect under the preponderance standard, and terminated parental rights after a dispositional hearing.
- The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the parents’ appeal.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutionality of the evidentiary standard used to terminate parental rights.

## Issues

1. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits termination of parental rights upon proof of permanent neglect by a preponderance of the evidence.
2. Whether due process requires a higher standard of proof, and if so, what minimum standard applies at the fact-finding stage of a state-initiated termination proceeding.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed, holding that New York’s use of a preponderance standard at the fact-finding stage violates due process.
- The Court required the State to prove the statutory ground for termination by at least clear and convincing evidence before parental rights may be irrevocably terminated.
- The majority applied the Mathews v. Eldridge framework, weighing the parents’ and children’s interests, the risk of error under the challenged procedure, and the State’s interests.
- The Court concluded that the preponderance standard creates an unacceptably high risk of erroneous termination in proceedings involving subjective assessments and uncertain predictions, and that requiring a higher standard would not unduly impede child-protection objectives.
- The dissent argued that the statutory scheme as a whole provided sufficient procedural protections and that the Court should defer more to the State’s legislative choice of proof standard.

## Legal Principles

- Natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, in the care, custody, and management of their children, which persists even after temporary loss of custody.
- Termination of parental rights is a final and irrevocable deprivation that demands fundamentally fair procedures.
- Due process determines the minimum constitutionally permissible burden of proof as a matter of federal law, assessed by balancing private interests, risk of erroneous deprivation, and governmental interests.
- In state-initiated termination proceedings, due process requires proof of the statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence at the fact-finding stage; a preponderance standard is constitutionally insufficient.
- Case-by-case appellate review cannot remedy a constitutionally defective burden of proof governing a class of proceedings.

## Conclusion

Santosky v. Kramer held that, because termination permanently severs the legal parent-child relationship and carries a high risk of error under a mere preponderance standard, the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State to prove grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.


Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)