Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997)

Facts

  • Anti-abortion protesters repeatedly blocked and hindered access to abortion clinics in western New York, including by occupying driveways and doorways and crowding vehicles and pedestrians.

  • The record included harassment and physical contact with patients, clinic employees, and escorts (e.g., crowding, jostling, grabbing, pushing, and yelling), and evidence that police response was ineffective.

  • Clinics, physicians, and an access-advocacy organization sued in federal court seeking injunctive relief to prevent obstruction and harassment.

  • The district court entered a preliminary injunction containing:

    • Fixed buffer zones: no demonstrating within 15 feet of clinic doorways, entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways, and driveway entrances.
    • Floating buffer zones: no demonstrating within 15 feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving the clinics.
  • The injunction also permitted up to two sidewalk counselors within the buffer areas, but required them to stop approaching and speaking if the person indicated a desire to be left alone.

  • The district court upheld the injunction against a First Amendment challenge, and the Second Circuit (en banc) affirmed.

Issues

  1. Whether the injunction’s 15-foot fixed buffer zones around clinic entrances and driveways violate the First Amendment.
  2. Whether the injunction’s 15-foot floating buffer zones around persons and vehicles seeking clinic access violate the First Amendment.

Decision

  • Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
  • The Court held the fixed buffer zones constitutional as content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to significant interests in access, safety, and order.
  • The Court held the floating buffer zones unconstitutional because they burdened more speech than necessary and created serious compliance and enforcement problems in a public sidewalk setting.
  • Injunctions restricting protest activity in traditional public fora may be upheld as content-neutral time, place, and manner limits when justified without reference to speech content and directed to safety, access, traffic flow, and property interests.
  • A fixed buffer zone around clinic entrances and driveways may be narrowly tailored where the record shows repeated obstruction and harassment and where speakers remain within sight and hearing of their intended audience.
  • A floating buffer zone tied to moving persons and vehicles may be invalid if it is overbroad, difficult to comply with and enforce, and substantially impairs close-range communication such as face-to-face advocacy or counseling.
  • A requirement that counselors stop after a clear request to be left alone can function as tailoring to reduce unwanted confrontations without broadly barring speech.

Conclusion

The Court permitted fixed, location-based buffer zones to protect clinic access and public safety, but rejected person- and vehicle-based floating zones because their shifting boundaries imposed excessive and unworkable burdens on protected speech in public spaces.