## Facts

- In 1948, while domiciled in Connecticut, Wilmer Scott and Grace Scott executed a written separation agreement anticipating divorce that settled property and support obligations.
- As part of that agreement, Wilmer executed a sealed assignment transferring one-half of his expectancy in his living father Thomas A. Scott’s estate to his minor daughter, Virginia Scott.
- The assignment recited $1 consideration; Grace also undertook significant financial responsibilities for Virginia’s support under the separation agreement.
- A Nevada divorce decree later issued; it incorporated some separation-agreement provisions but did not expressly incorporate or mention the expectancy assignment.
- Thomas A. Scott, then living but mentally incompetent at the time of the assignment, died in Maryland in 1958, leaving an estate of about $490,000.
- The estate administrator, First National Bank of Baltimore, faced competing claims by Wilmer (seeking his share outright) and Virginia (seeking enforcement of the assignment).
- Wilmer challenged the assignment as invalid because it involved a mere expectancy, allegedly lacked adequate consideration, and allegedly merged into the divorce decree.

## Issues

1. Whether the validity and enforceability of the expectancy assignment were governed by Connecticut law.
2. Whether an assignment of a mere expectancy in a living ancestor’s estate is enforceable in equity after the ancestor’s death when supported by fair and adequate consideration.
3. Whether the assignment failed for lack of consideration or unfairness.
4. Whether the separation agreement and assignment were extinguished by “merger” into the Nevada divorce decree, barring independent enforcement.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s decree directing distribution consistent with the assignment.
- Connecticut law governed because the separation agreement and assignment were executed by Connecticut domiciliaries in Connecticut.
- Under Connecticut law, although a mere expectancy is not assignable at law, equity will enforce a fair, supported assignment once the expectancy ripens into a vested interest at the ancestor’s death.
- The consideration was not limited to the $1 recital; the separation agreement’s mutual obligations, including Grace’s substantial support undertakings, supplied adequate consideration and showed fairness.
- The merger argument did not defeat enforcement; it was not properly preserved and, in any event, did not eliminate the assignment’s enforceability.
- The ancestor’s knowledge or consent to the assignment was not required for equitable enforcement.

## Legal Principles

- Choice of law for a separation-agreement assignment is determined by the place and parties’ domicile at execution when those contacts predominate.
- A mere expectancy in a living ancestor’s estate is generally not assignable at law, but equity may enforce an assignment after vesting if the transaction was fair and supported by valuable consideration.
- Consideration and fairness may be assessed from the entire separation agreement, not solely from nominal consideration stated in the assignment instrument.
- A divorce decree’s incorporation of some agreement terms does not necessarily extinguish independent contractual or equitable enforcement of other bargained-for provisions.
- Equitable enforcement of an expectancy assignment does not require the ancestor’s knowledge or consent.

## Conclusion

The court held that Connecticut law controlled and required equitable enforcement of Wilmer Scott’s separation-agreement assignment of half his inheritance expectancy to his daughter once the ancestor died and the interest vested, because the assignment was part of a fair, supported marital settlement and was not defeated by the later divorce decree.


Scott v. First Nat’l Bank of Balt., 224 Md. 462, 168 A.2d 349 (1961)