## Facts

- ABN AMRO Holding N.V. (ABN) was a Netherlands-based bank with operations that included a New York branch through which it provided banking services and sold financial products.
- ABN’s corporate governance structure included a managing board, responsible for day-to-day management and operations, and a supervisory board, responsible for oversight and advice to the managing board.
- Beginning in 2003, U.S. federal and state regulators investigated ABN’s internal controls and its compliance with U.S. banking and anti–money-laundering requirements, and also examined whether conduct connected to ABN’s Dubai branch violated U.S. sanctions laws.
- The regulatory scrutiny led to enforcement outcomes that included substantial penalties (including an $80 million deferred prosecution agreement and a $40 million civil penalty, as alleged in the complaint materials described by the court).
- Marlene Seybold, a U.S. investor who owned ABN American Depository Receipts (ADRs) traded on a U.S. stock exchange, filed a putative shareholder derivative action in the Southern District of New York.
- Seybold sued on ABN’s behalf against 18 current or former ABN directors and officers, including Rijkman Groenink, ABN’s management-board chairman, asserting breach of fiduciary duty and aiding-and-abetting theories tied to the compliance failures and resulting penalties.
- Seybold invoked federal diversity jurisdiction and relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 as a procedural vehicle for the derivative suit.
- The parties presented Dutch law to the court. Under Dutch law, members of ABN’s management board owed fiduciary duties to ABN (the company), not directly to ABN’s shareholders.
- As a general rule, Dutch law did not allow shareholders to prosecute derivative claims on a company’s behalf against management-board or supervisory-board members.
- Dutch law recognized limited circumstances in which a shareholder might be authorized to sue on the company’s behalf: (1) a majority vote at a general meeting granting authority, (2) delegation of authority by the managing board, or (3) authorization in the company’s articles of association.
- Seybold did not allege that any of those Dutch-law authorization paths applied to her, and defendants moved to dismiss for lack of derivative standing (among other grounds).

## Issues

1. Under New York choice-of-law rules and the internal-affairs doctrine, does Dutch law govern whether an ABN ADR holder may sue derivatively on ABN’s behalf?
2. If Dutch law governs, did Seybold have authority (standing) to bring a derivative action against ABN’s directors and officers absent a Dutch-law authorization mechanism?

## Decision

- The court applied New York choice-of-law principles and held that the law of the place of incorporation governs claims involving directors’ duties and a shareholder’s ability to sue on the corporation’s behalf; because ABN was incorporated in the Netherlands, Dutch law controlled.
- The court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 does not create a substantive right to sue derivatively; it governs pleading and procedure once a plaintiff has a substantive right under the applicable corporate law.
- Applying Dutch law as presented, the court concluded that individual investors generally may not assert corporate claims for directors’ alleged breaches and that enforcement is reserved to the company (acting through appropriate corporate bodies) and certain Dutch public or judicial mechanisms.
- Because Seybold did not plead any Dutch-law basis authorizing her to sue on ABN’s behalf (such as shareholder approval, managing-board delegation, or a provision in ABN’s articles), she lacked standing to pursue the derivative action.
- The court dismissed the complaint in its entirety with prejudice and denied other pending motions as moot.

## Legal Principles

- Under New York conflicts rules, the internal affairs of a corporation—including directors’ duties and whether a shareholder may sue on the corporation’s behalf—are governed by the law of the corporation’s place of incorporation.
- Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 is procedural; it does not supply the substantive source of a shareholder’s right to sue derivatively.
- When foreign corporate law does not permit shareholders to bring derivative actions (or permits them only under specified authorization conditions), a U.S. court will apply that substantive rule to determine standing.
- Allegations of board domination, demand futility, or serious misconduct do not create a derivative right where the governing corporate law withholds derivative authority from shareholders.
- If the governing foreign law forecloses derivative standing and no amendment could plead an available authorization route, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.

## Conclusion

Seybold’s derivative case was dismissed because ABN was a Dutch corporation and Dutch law governed internal-affairs questions, including whether an ADR holder could sue on ABN’s behalf; since Dutch law generally bars shareholder derivative litigation and Seybold alleged no recognized authorization allowing her to proceed, she lacked standing and the complaint was dismissed with prejudice.


Seybold v. Groenink, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16994 (2007)