Facts
- On May 2, 2008, a group of people—including Lorenzo Ross and Martin Scales—were outside Ross’s apartment building on the 4900 block of Jay Street, NE, Washington, D.C.
- Kendell A. Snowden was among a group of five youths in the area; Ross testified he recognized Snowden from prior familiarity in the neighborhood.
- Snowden and four others approached Ross and Scales and robbed them at gunpoint.
- During the robbery, a second gunman arrived and kept a firearm trained on the victims while Scales surrendered $20 to Snowden.
- Scales attempted to disarm Snowden, and a brief struggle occurred.
- After the struggle, Snowden and his cohorts ran from the scene.
- The second gunman stayed behind with the gun still pointed at Scales and, about 15 seconds after Snowden and the others fled, shot Scales in the abdomen.
- The government prosecuted Snowden on a conspiracy theory, arguing that, as a conspirator in an armed-robbery plan, Snowden was vicariously liable for the shooting as a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator.
- A jury convicted Snowden of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, four counts of assault with intent to rob while armed (AWIRWA), aggravated assault while armed (AAWA) based on Scales’s shooting, and two counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (PFCV).
Issues
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Snowden of aggravated assault while armed on a co-conspirator-liability theory—i.e., that the shooting was committed in furtherance of the armed-robbery conspiracy and was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of it.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the AWIRWA convictions.
- Whether the eyewitness identification of Snowden was so unreliable that it could not support the verdicts beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Whether, for sentencing, (a) the four AWIRWA convictions had to merge into a single conviction and (b) the two PFCV convictions had to merge with the underlying armed robbery and AAWA convictions.
Decision
- The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed Snowden’s convictions.
- The court held that the evidence permitted the jury to find the shooting occurred in furtherance of the armed-robbery conspiracy and was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an armed robbery, even though the shot was fired shortly after Snowden fled.
- The court held the evidence was sufficient to sustain the AWIRWA convictions, including treating the assaults as separately punishable offenses as charged.
- The court ruled that the identification evidence was not so unreliable that no reasonable juror could credit it; reliability disputes were for the jury to weigh.
- The court rejected Snowden’s merger arguments and upheld separate convictions and sentences for the multiple AWIRWA counts and for the PFCV counts in relation to the underlying violent offenses.
Legal Principles
- A conspirator may be held liable for a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator if the act is committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and is a reasonably foreseeable result of the unlawful agreement.
- On sufficiency review, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and asks whether any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Identification testimony is generally evaluated by the jury; an appellate court will not set aside a verdict on reliability grounds unless the identification is so deficient that no rational juror could rely on it.
- When a statute protects individual persons from assaultive conduct, separate victims can support separate counts arising from a single criminal episode, depending on the unit of prosecution.
- Under D.C. law, possession of a firearm during a crime of violence is a distinct offense and does not automatically merge with the underlying crime of violence.
Conclusion
Snowden v. United States affirmed convictions arising from a group armed robbery and a near-immediate shooting of a resisting victim, holding that the jury could attribute the shooting to Snowden under co-conspirator liability because it furthered the robbery scheme and was reasonably foreseeable, and further holding that the identification evidence and the multiple-count sentencing structure did not require reversal or merger.