## Facts

- Police used an informant, Sean McGrath, to arrange a controlled purchase of cocaine and ecstasy from Sean Phillips while officers monitored the meeting from a nearby vehicle using a hidden wire.
- At the scheduled time, officers saw a black vehicle pull up near McGrath’s car, drop Phillips off, and drive away.
- Over the wire, officers heard sounds indicating a robbery rather than a drug sale; Phillips robbed McGrath at gunpoint and took drugs and money.
- After the robbery, Phillips ran back toward the black vehicle that had dropped him off.
- Officers pursued the black vehicle and attempted to stop it; the vehicle swerved and sped away.
- After a short chase, officers found the black vehicle parked with its doors open and observed Donshae Coleman walking away nearby.
- Officers arrested Phillips and Coleman. The State charged Phillips with first-degree robbery and charged Coleman with first-degree robbery as an accomplice (along with other firearm- and assault-related counts arising from the incident).
- Before trial, Phillips entered a plea agreement requiring him to testify against Coleman.
- Phillips testified that, the day before the incident, he told Coleman he planned to rob McGrath; Phillips also testified Coleman obtained a gun and agreed to pick Phillips up after the robbery.
- The trial court instructed the jury that Coleman could be found guilty as an accomplice if, acting with knowledge that his conduct would further or facilitate a crime, he aided or agreed to aid in planning or committing that crime; the court also gave a definitional instruction stating that a person “acts with knowledge” if he acts intentionally (or is aware of a high probability that a fact exists).
- The jury convicted Coleman of first-degree robbery as an accomplice, and Coleman appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the accomplice-liability instructions were erroneous because they did not require proof of a separate “overt act” beyond “aiding or agreeing to aid” the robbery.
2. Whether the definitional instruction equating “knowledge” with acting “intentionally” misstated the required mental state and allowed conviction without a finding that Coleman knew his conduct would further or facilitate the robbery.
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Coleman’s conviction for first-degree robbery as an accomplice.

## Decision

- The Washington Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed Coleman’s convictions.
- The court held the accomplice-liability instructions, read together, accurately stated Washington law and did not remove the requirement that the jury find Coleman acted with knowledge that his conduct would further or facilitate the robbery.
- The court rejected Coleman’s argument that a separate “overt act” element had to be included in the accomplice instruction beyond the statutory concepts of aiding or agreeing to aid.
- The court held the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Coleman was an accomplice to first-degree robbery.

## Legal Principles

- In Washington, a person is an accomplice if, with knowledge that it will further or facilitate the commission of a crime, the person aids or agrees to aid another in planning or committing the crime.
- Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole; error occurs only if the instructions, taken together, misstate the law or mislead the jury as to an element the State must prove.
- An accomplice-liability instruction need not add a separate “overt act” requirement when it already requires proof that the defendant aided or agreed to aid the crime with the required knowledge.
- A definitional instruction linking “knowledge” and “intentional” action is not reversible error when the accomplice instruction still requires the jury to find the defendant knew his conduct would further or facilitate the specific crime charged.
- On sufficiency review, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and the conviction stands if any rational trier of fact could have found the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeals affirmed Coleman’s first-degree robbery conviction as an accomplice, holding that the jury instructions—considered together—properly required a finding that Coleman acted with knowledge that his conduct would further or facilitate the robbery and that he aided or agreed to aid Phillips, and that the evidence (including Phillips’s testimony about Coleman’s advance knowledge, obtaining the gun, and acting as the driver) was sufficient to support the verdict.


State v. Coleman, 231 P.3d 212 (2010)