State v. Gordon, 321 A.2d 352 (1974)

Facts

  • Richard John Gordon and Edwin Strode escaped from custody in Vermont while being held on a misdemeanor charge.
  • During the escape, they obtained two handguns and a blue station wagon and fled from Vermont through New Hampshire into Maine.
  • Near Standish, Maine, the station wagon began to show engine trouble, and the men looked for another vehicle.
  • They arrived at the home of Franklin Prout, where Prout’s 1966 maroon Chevelle was parked in the yard with the keys inside.
  • Gordon drove the station wagon parallel to the Chevelle; Strode exited the station wagon and entered the Chevelle.
  • When Prout came outside, Strode pointed a gun at him.
  • Gordon and Strode told Prout they needed his automobile, were going to take it, and would “take care of it” and see that Prout got it back as soon as possible.
  • Gordon drove the station wagon away, and Strode drove away in Prout’s Chevelle.
  • The station wagon was later abandoned in a sand pit, and Gordon and Strode continued their flight in Prout’s Chevelle.
  • A connected sequence of events followed, including the alleged assault (with intent to kill) on Westbrook police officer Harold Stultz, a shootout in Westbrook, and a high-speed police chase.
  • Near the Maine Medical Center area in Portland, the Chevelle was driven off the road and abandoned; Gordon and Strode then commandeered another automobile and continued fleeing.
  • A Cumberland County grand jury indicted Gordon for armed robbery (17 M.R.S.A. § 3401-A) and, in a separate indictment, for assaulting Officer Stultz with intent to kill.
  • Over Gordon’s objection, the trial court ordered the two indictments tried together before one jury.
  • The jury convicted Gordon of armed robbery but could not reach a verdict on the assault charge, resulting in a mistrial on that count.
  • Gordon appealed from the armed-robbery judgment of conviction.

Issues

  1. Whether the evidence and jury instructions permitted a finding of the felonious intent required for armed robbery when the defendants said they would return the car.
  2. Whether armed robbery requires proof that the defendant intended personal gain from the taking, or instead only an intent to permanently deprive the owner (including by abandonment under circumstances making recovery a matter of chance).
  3. Whether trying the armed-robbery and assault-with-intent-to-kill indictments together, and the prosecutor’s opening reference to Strode’s conviction, required reversal due to unfair prejudice.

Decision

  • The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed Gordon’s armed-robbery conviction and denied the appeal.
  • The court held the jury could find the intent element satisfied by an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property; the State did not also have to prove an intent that the defendant personally “gain” from the taking.
  • The court held that an intended abandonment, when done in a way that leaves recovery of the property to chance, may support a finding of intent to permanently deprive.
  • The court concluded Gordon’s statement that Prout would get the car back did not bar the jury from inferring felonious intent from the surrounding circumstances, including the armed taking during flight and the later abandonment.
  • The court held consolidation of the two indictments for one trial was within the presiding justice’s discretion given the connected course of events, and Gordon did not show prejudice warranting a new trial.
  • The court held the prosecutor’s improper opening remark about Strode’s conviction did not require reversal in light of the court’s instructions that opening statements are not evidence and the strength of the proof of armed robbery.
  • Under Maine law, armed robbery requires proof of a felonious taking, which is satisfied by intent to permanently deprive the owner of property; an additional intent to obtain personal gain is not required.
  • An intent to abandon property under circumstances that make the owner’s recovery depend on chance may be treated as intent to permanently deprive.
  • A jury may infer intent from all the circumstances surrounding the taking and subsequent conduct, even if the defendant claims the property will be returned.
  • Related indictments arising from the same connected episode may be tried together at the court’s discretion; reversal requires a showing of unfair prejudice.
  • Improper comments in an opening statement may be cured by prompt instructions that arguments are not evidence, and may be harmless when the verdict is supported by strong evidence.

Conclusion

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld Gordon’s armed-robbery conviction, ruling that the armed taking of Prout’s car during an escape—followed by abandonment during flight—allowed the jury to find intent to permanently deprive despite a stated plan to return the car, and that neither the joint trial with the related assault indictment nor the prosecutor’s opening reference to Strode’s conviction justified reversal.