## Facts

- Providence undercover detectives Angelo A’Vant and Fabio Zuena patrolled an area near Public and Broad Streets after complaints of drug activity.
- Robert Clement approached the detectives’ unmarked car and asked whether they were looking to buy “rock” (crack cocaine).
- Clement directed the detectives to 55 Daboll Street and led Detective A’Vant to a detached garage area at the rear of the property while Detective Zuena remained in the car.
- Detective A’Vant gave Clement $20 in prerecorded buy money as payment for crack cocaine.
- Clement rang a doorbell; Antonio Mendoza answered, and Mendoza and Clement briefly went inside.
- Detective A’Vant observed Mendoza hand Clement a clear plastic bag containing a rock-like substance.
- Clement immediately returned to the car and handed the bag to Detective A’Vant; the detectives then identified themselves and arrested Clement.
- Mendoza was arrested shortly thereafter; evidence at trial included testimony that he attempted to flee and physically resisted officers during the arrest process.
- At the police station, a search of Mendoza revealed three bags of marijuana.
- A jury convicted Mendoza of delivery of a controlled substance, conspiracy to violate the Rhode Island Controlled Substances Act, possession of marijuana, and resisting arrest.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial justice erred in denying Mendoza’s motion to pass the case (mistrial) based on an allegedly improper prosecutorial question and claimed nondisclosure.
2. Whether the trial justice erred in denying Mendoza’s motion for judgment of acquittal on (a) conspiracy and (b) resisting arrest, including whether Wharton’s Rule made the conspiracy charge a legal impossibility.
3. Whether the trial justice erred by instructing the jury that flight may be considered as evidence of consciousness of guilt.
4. Whether it was error to permit the state to impeach Clement with his guilty plea, allegedly creating unfair prejudice to Mendoza.
5. Whether the trial justice erred in denying a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

## Decision

- The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
- The Court held the trial justice did not abuse discretion in denying the motion to pass because any potential prejudice from the challenged question was addressed by the court’s handling of the objection and instructions, and the record did not establish a reversible discovery violation.
- The Court held the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find conspiracy and resisting arrest beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The Court rejected Mendoza’s Wharton’s Rule argument and upheld the conspiracy conviction, concluding the conspiracy charge was not barred merely because the completed drug transaction involved more than one person.
- The Court held the flight instruction was supported by evidence of Mendoza’s conduct when police sought to arrest him and was properly limited so the jury could decide what, if anything, the flight showed.
- The Court held Clement’s guilty plea could be admitted for impeachment (credibility and bias) with a limiting instruction that it was not proof of Mendoza’s guilt.
- The Court affirmed denial of a new trial, concluding the proffered “newly discovered” evidence did not satisfy the requirements for that relief and was not likely to change the verdict.

## Legal Principles

- A motion to pass (mistrial) is an extraordinary remedy and is reviewed for abuse of discretion; prompt curative instructions may cure prejudice from an improper question or remark.
- On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the state, drawing reasonable inferences consistent with guilt.
- Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence showing an agreement and knowing participation; coordinated conduct surrounding a drug sale can support an inference of an agreement.
- Wharton’s Rule does not automatically bar a conspiracy conviction simply because the substantive offense involves concerted activity; courts assess whether the conspiracy is separately punishable under the statutory scheme and whether the rule’s narrow conditions apply.
- A flight instruction is permissible when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant fled to avoid arrest or prosecution, provided the jury is told flight is not a presumption of guilt.
- A cooperating witness’s guilty plea may be used to impeach credibility and show bias, but it may not be treated as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt; a limiting instruction is required.
- A new trial based on newly discovered evidence requires, among other things, diligence and a showing that the evidence would likely change the outcome; evidence that is cumulative, impeaching only, or unlikely to alter the verdict does not justify a new trial.

## Conclusion

State v. Mendoza affirmed Mendoza’s convictions arising from an undercover crack-cocaine purchase and his later arrest, holding that the trial court properly denied a mistrial and acquittal motions, that Wharton’s Rule did not bar the conspiracy charge, that a flight instruction was supported by the evidence, that a co-conspirator’s guilty plea was admissible for impeachment with limiting instructions, and that Mendoza failed to meet the standard for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.


State v. Mendoza, 889 A.2d 153 (2005)