Facts
- Paulson Papillon and three associates operated a drug-dealing business in Manchester, New Hampshire.
- After Papillon’s arrest following drug sales, he mistakenly believed customer M.P. was a confidential informant.
- After release on bail, Papillon repeatedly encouraged his associates to kill M.P., supplied a gun and Halloween disguises, and planned to be out of state to create an alibi; the planned Halloween killing did not occur.
- On November 3, 2015, the associates encountered M.P. outside his apartment; one associate shot and killed M.P.
- Minutes after the shooting, the shooter contacted Papillon, who had positioned himself out of state; Papillon instructed another associate to call M.P. to confirm whether he was dead.
- After the killing, Papillon met with the participants, heard details, and distributed drugs and money; he later transported two of them to Connecticut.
- Papillon made inculpatory statements linking himself to the killing and took steps to keep participants quiet, including arranging delivery of drugs and money while incarcerated.
- Papillon discussed plans to kill coconspirators if they cooperated and told another inmate that he “had to have M.P. killed.”
Issues
- Whether the trial court improperly allowed Papillon to waive counsel and represent himself when the waiver was allegedly not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
- Whether admitting testimony that Papillon offered to kill another informant violated Rule 404(b) and, if so, whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove conspiracy to commit murder, including an agreement and intent to promote or facilitate the murder.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Papillon as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder, and whether accomplice liability can attach to a reckless homicide when the defendant acted purposefully.
- Whether convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and accomplice to reckless second-degree murder are legally or logically inconsistent.
Decision
- The court affirmed the convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and accomplice to reckless second-degree murder.
- The court held Papillon validly waived counsel after a thorough colloquy and knowingly chose self-representation with standby counsel.
- The court concluded admission of certain other-bad-acts evidence was erroneous but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the strength of the remaining evidence.
- The court held the circumstantial evidence supported a finding of a tacit agreement to kill M.P. and Papillon’s intent to promote or facilitate the murder.
- The court held accomplice liability required intent to promote the conduct constituting the offense, not identity between the accomplice’s and principal’s mental state as to the result; the verdicts were not inconsistent.
Legal Principles
- A defendant may waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, typically established through an on-the-record colloquy.
- Improper admission of other-bad-acts evidence may be affirmed if the State proves the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the remaining evidence.
- Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence of a tacit agreement and the defendant’s intent to promote or facilitate commission of the target offense.
- Under New Hampshire accomplice law, liability turns on intent to promote or facilitate the conduct constituting the crime; conviction for a reckless-result offense does not require the accomplice to share the principal’s reckless mental state as to the result.
- Conspiracy and the substantive offense are distinct; differing mens rea elements between conspiracy to kill and reckless homicide do not, by themselves, render verdicts inconsistent.
Conclusion
The court upheld Papillon’s convictions, finding a valid waiver of counsel, harmlessness of a Rule 404(b) evidentiary error, sufficient evidence of a tacit murder conspiracy and accomplice participation, and no legal inconsistency in pairing conspiracy to commit murder with accomplice liability for reckless second-degree murder.