## Facts

- Rider believed R. P. Tallent was having an affair with Rider’s wife.
- Rider armed himself with a shotgun and went near Tallent’s home to find his wife and confront Tallent.
- A confrontation occurred near Tallent’s home in which Tallent approached Rider carrying an axe.
- Rider shot and killed Tallent; the defense claimed the shooting occurred in self-defense in response to an imminent axe attack.
- The State argued Rider went to the location armed and with a preexisting intent to kill Tallent.
- At trial, the court admitted (over objection) testimony about Tallent’s post-shooting statements, and admitted evidence that Rider had previously beaten his wife and that she feared he would kill her.
- The trial court excluded defense evidence of Tallent’s prior threats against Rider.
- The jury was instructed, in substance, that Rider was guilty of first-degree murder if he went intending to kill Tallent, armed himself, sought Tallent, and killed him; Rider was convicted of first-degree murder.

## Issues

1. Whether the victim’s post-shooting statements were admissible as dying declarations or as part of the res gestae.
2. Whether evidence of Rider’s prior abuse of his wife and her fear of him was inadmissible hearsay and improper other-misconduct evidence.
3. Whether the trial court erred by excluding evidence of Tallent’s prior threats against Rider offered to support self-defense.
4. Whether the State’s first-degree murder instruction was erroneous for permitting conviction based on intent to kill without requiring deliberation and for failing to account for self-defense evidence.
5. Whether the prosecution could impeach Rider, after he testified, by inquiry into his general reputation for truthfulness, morality, and chastity.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the first-degree murder conviction and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held the victim’s post-shooting statements were improperly admitted because they were neither dying declarations nor part of the res gestae.
- The court held evidence of Rider’s prior beating of his wife and her fear that he would kill her was improperly admitted as unrelated other-misconduct evidence and (in part) hearsay.
- The court held the defense should have been allowed to present evidence of Tallent’s prior threats because it was relevant to self-defense and corroborated the claimed axe assault.
- The court held the principal first-degree murder instruction was legally defective because it allowed conviction without a finding of deliberation and effectively permitted the jury to disregard self-defense.
- The court treated the character-impeachment issue as secondary, indicating the inquiry required careful limitation under the governing statute.

## Legal Principles

- A victim’s statements made after the central event are inadmissible unless a recognized exception applies; dying declarations require proof the declarant spoke under a settled belief of impending death, and res gestae requires sufficient contemporaneity with the occurrence.
- Evidence of unrelated prior misconduct by the accused is inadmissible when its principal effect is propensity reasoning rather than proof of a material element or fact in dispute.
- In a homicide case where self-defense is supported by evidence, prior threats by the deceased against the defendant are admissible to show hostility and to corroborate the defendant’s account of the encounter.
- First-degree murder requires deliberation beyond a bare intent to kill; instructions must require the jury to find the statutory mental state and must not be framed to exclude consideration of self-defense supported by evidence.
- A defendant who testifies may be impeached as a witness, but the scope of reputation-based impeachment is subject to statutory and common-law limits and must be carefully confined.

## Conclusion

The court ordered a new trial because the jury heard inadmissible hearsay and unrelated other-misconduct evidence, was denied relevant threat evidence supporting self-defense, and received an instruction that permitted first-degree murder conviction without requiring deliberation or properly allowing consideration of self-defense at the moment of the killing.


State v. Rider, 90 Mo. 54, 1 S.W. 825 (Mo. 1886)