## Facts

- William D. Shine drank heavily at a bar over several hours, including a “free beer” period.
- Shine argued with Alan Tierney at the bar.
- After leaving around 1:00 a.m., Alan leaned into Shine’s driver-side window and choked him; Shine drove forward, and Alan fell and injured his knee.
- Shine drove around the parking lot, returned to where Alan and Darlene Tierney stood, and struck both with his car before leaving.
- Alan died; Darlene was injured and hospitalized.
- Shine was charged with first-degree manslaughter (for Alan’s death) and first-degree assault (for Darlene’s injuries), both requiring proof of recklessness.
- Before trial, Shine sought to introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication to show he lacked recklessness; the trial court excluded the evidence.
- A jury convicted Shine on both counts.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant may introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the culpable mental state of recklessness for first-degree manslaughter and first-degree assault.
2. Whether Connecticut’s rule limiting intoxication evidence to “specific intent” crimes permits intoxication evidence in prosecutions based on recklessness.
3. Whether the jury instructions on intent and recklessness, including “ordinary consequences” language, unconstitutionally shifted or diluted the state’s burden of proof under due process principles reflected in *Sandstrom*.

## Decision

- The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
- The court held voluntary intoxication is not admissible to negate recklessness.
- The court reaffirmed that Connecticut allows intoxication evidence only to contest specific intent, not general intent-type mental states such as recklessness.
- The court held the jury instructions, read as a whole, did not create a mandatory or burden-shifting presumption and did not violate due process.

## Legal Principles

- In Connecticut, voluntary intoxication evidence is admissible only to show absence of specific intent; it is not admissible to negate recklessness.
- Crimes defined by recklessness are treated as non–specific intent offenses for purposes of the intoxication rule.
- Specific intent involves an intent to achieve a result beyond the proscribed act; general intent requires only intent to do the act described by the statute.
- An intent instruction referencing “ordinary consequences” does not violate due process if the charge, considered as a whole, leaves the inference permissive and repeatedly places the burden of proof on the state beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Shine’s first-degree manslaughter and first-degree assault convictions, ruling that voluntary intoxication cannot be used to rebut recklessness in Connecticut and that the challenged intent and recklessness instructions did not improperly shift the burden of proof.


State v. Shine, 193 Conn. 632, 479 A.2d 218 (Conn. 1984)