Facts
- On October 7, 1975, at the Silver Moon Tavern in Clifton, New Jersey, Thomas Stasio spent hours drinking with patron Robert Colburn.
- Colburn testified that despite drinking, Stasio’s speech and mannerisms did not indicate drunkenness when Colburn left around 3:00 p.m.
- Around 5:40 p.m., Stasio entered the tavern, walked normally to the bathroom, returned, looked outside, and demanded money from bartender Peter Klimek.
- After Klimek refused, Stasio went behind the bar, insisted on $80 from the cash register, and produced a knife when refused again.
- Klimek and Colburn subdued Stasio; during the struggle the knife was dropped.
- Officer Robert Rowan arrived shortly thereafter and arrested Stasio; witnesses again indicated Stasio did not appear drunk.
- Stasio was charged with assault with intent to rob (N.J.S.A. 2A:90-2) and assault while armed with a dangerous knife (N.J.S.A. 2A:151-5).
Issues
- Whether voluntary intoxication may be asserted to negate the intent element of a crime, including offenses traditionally treated as requiring specific intent such as assault with intent to rob.
- Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that intoxication could negate intent.
Decision
- The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the convictions.
- The court held that, under New Jersey pre-Code common law, voluntary intoxication is generally not a defense to criminal liability, including crimes requiring intent.
- The trial judge did not err by refusing an intoxication instruction because voluntary intoxication could not be used to defeat the intent element for these offenses.
- The court recognized only limited, historically accepted situations where intoxication may matter (such as intoxication producing legal insanity, or negating premeditation in murder).
Legal Principles
- Voluntary intoxication ordinarily does not excuse criminal conduct and is not a general defense to crimes requiring intent.
- Reliance on the specific-intent/general-intent distinction to determine availability of an intoxication defense is disfavored due to practical and doctrinal instability.
- Intoxication evidence may be relevant only within narrow, historically recognized exceptions (including insanity and premeditation in murder).
- Policy considerations may support refusing to reduce criminal accountability for harms committed after self-induced intoxication.
Conclusion
The court reaffirmed New Jersey’s pre-Code common-law rule that self-induced intoxication generally cannot negate intent or provide a defense, and it upheld the trial court’s refusal to charge voluntary intoxication in a prosecution for assault with intent to rob and related armed assault.