State v. Williams, 229 N.C. 348, 49 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. 1948)

Facts

  • Bud Hicks shot and mortally wounded Thompson Hooker on June 6, 1948, in Sanford, North Carolina.
  • Immediately after the shooting, Hicks fled Sanford in his own automobile driven by defendant Prentiss Watson; defendants Annie Williams and Elizabeth Badgett rode with them.
  • Officers later found Hicks and the defendants at Williams’s home in rural Lee County.
  • When officers attempted to arrest Hicks, Hicks, Watson, and Williams unsuccessfully tried to deter the arrest by falsely stating Hicks had not been in Sanford that day.
  • Hooker did not die until later (the next day) from the gunshot wound.
  • Defendants were indicted and convicted as accessories after the fact to the felony of Hooker’s murder, based on transporting Hicks and attempting to mislead officers.

Issues

  1. Whether a defendant may be convicted as an accessory after the fact to murder when the alleged assistance occurs after the victim is mortally wounded but before the victim dies.
  2. Whether the State’s evidence was sufficient to survive a motion for judgment of nonsuit on an accessory-after-the-fact-to-murder charge when all assistance occurred before death.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the convictions.
  • The court held the trial court should have allowed defendants’ motions for judgment of nonsuit.
  • Because the alleged aid occurred before Hooker’s death, the felony of murder was not yet “an accomplished fact,” and accessory-after-the-fact liability for murder could not be established on this record.
  • To convict for accessory after the fact, the State must prove: (1) the principal actually committed the specified felony, (2) the defendant knew the felony had been committed, and (3) the defendant assisted the principal to help the principal escape or to hinder arrest, trial, or punishment.
  • A person cannot be an accessory after the fact until the underlying felony has been completed.
  • For murder, the felony is not complete until the victim dies; the time of death controls when murder is “committed” for this purpose.
  • Assistance rendered after a mortal wounding but before death may support other theories of liability, but it is insufficient for accessory after the fact to murder.

Conclusion

Because the defendants’ transportation of Hicks and false statements to officers occurred before the victim’s death, the State failed to show that defendants assisted a principal felon after the completed felony of murder; the convictions for accessory after the fact to murder were therefore reversed and nonsuit was required.