## Facts

- Richard L. Timberlake and Sherry L. Timberlake (later Heflin) were married and owned a two-bedroom home/condominium in Berkeley County, West Virginia, as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
- When the couple decided to divorce, they made a parol (oral) agreement dividing their marital property: Sherry would receive a jointly owned automobile, a motorcycle, and other personal property, and Richard would receive the home.
- Under the agreement, Sherry was to execute and deliver a deed transferring her interest in the home to Richard.
- Sherry filed a divorce complaint in the Circuit Court of Berkeley County. The complaint contained an averment identifying the real property and stating that she agreed to convey her interest in the jointly owned real estate to Richard.
- Sherry supported the divorce complaint with a signed, sworn affidavit stating that the allegations in the complaint were true.
- Richard relied on the oral agreement and Sherry’s sworn pleading and did not pursue further action in the divorce case to obtain a disposition of the home.
- The final divorce decree divided some marital property but made no disposition of the home.
- Richard then filed a civil action seeking specific performance of the oral agreement to require Sherry to convey her interest in the home.
- Sherry and her new husband filed a joint motion to dismiss, arguing that the Statute of Frauds (W. Va. Code § 36-1-3) barred enforcement because the agreement concerned an interest in land and was not in writing.
- The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding there was no sufficient written memorandum satisfying W. Va. Code § 36-1-3.
- Richard appealed. After the appeal was granted, Richard died and the executor of his estate, Roxanne Timberlake, was substituted as the appellant.

## Issues

1. Whether a spouse’s sworn divorce complaint (and verification/affidavit), signed by the spouse to be charged and stating she “agrees to convey her interest” in specifically identified real estate, constitutes a sufficient memorandum to satisfy W. Va. Code § 36-1-3 and permit enforcement of an otherwise oral agreement to transfer the property.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court’s dismissal and remanded.
- The court held that the sworn divorce complaint and verification provided a sufficient written memorandum to satisfy W. Va. Code § 36-1-3, so the Statute of Frauds did not bar the specific-performance claim at the pleading stage.

## Legal Principles

- A contract for the sale or transfer of an interest in land generally must be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. See W. Va. Code § 36-1-3.
- The required “memorandum” need not be a formal contract; it may be any signed writing that states the essential terms of the transaction with reasonable certainty.
- A verified or sworn pleading can serve as a Statute of Frauds memorandum when it is signed (or verified) by the party to be charged, identifies the parties, describes the property with sufficient clarity, and acknowledges the agreement or promise to convey.
- When such a signed, sworn writing exists, a court should not dismiss a complaint for specific performance solely on Statute of Frauds grounds; the claim may proceed to be resolved on its merits.

## Conclusion

Timberlake v. Heflin held that an oral property-transfer agreement between divorcing spouses was not barred by W. Va. Code § 36-1-3 where the spouse who was to convey her interest filed a signed, sworn divorce complaint stating she agreed to convey her interest in the specifically described jointly owned home, and the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings on the specific-performance claim.


Timberlake v. Heflin, 379 S.E.2d 149 (1989)