## Facts

- Aimee Sue Travis worked for Greenville Wire Products Co. and was injured when her hands were caught in a mechanical press.
- The press, manufactured by Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., had allegedly been malfunctioning before the accident.
- Travis alleged her supervisor knew of the malfunction and required continued operation rather than shutting the press down for repair.
- Travis filed a tort action against her employer (and also sued the manufacturer), alleging the employer’s conduct fit the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA) “intentional tort” exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity.
- In a companion consolidated case, Stanislaw Golec, an employee of Metal Exchange Corp., was severely injured in a workplace explosion.
- Golec alleged supervisors failed to provide proper protective equipment and dismissed safety concerns about a dangerous condition that led to the explosion.
- Trial courts granted the employers summary judgment in both cases on the ground that the WDCA provided the exclusive remedy.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, finding each plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to proceed under the intentional-tort exception.

## Issues

1. How should the WDCA “intentional tort” exception be construed, including the statutory requirements of “specific intent to injure” and “actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur” with “wilful disregard”?
2. Whether Travis’s allegations were sufficient as a matter of law to place her claim within the intentional-tort exception.
3. Whether Golec’s allegations were sufficient as a matter of law to place his claim within the intentional-tort exception.
4. Whether the existence of an employer intentional tort under the WDCA is initially determined by the court or the jury on a motion for summary judgment.
5. To what extent, if any, intentional-tort claims may proceed against individual coemployees in Golec’s case.

## Decision

- The court adopted a narrow construction of the WDCA intentional-tort exception, rejecting negligence-, gross-negligence-, or recklessness-based expansions.
- As to Travis, the court held the alleged facts were legally insufficient to show the required specific intent to injure or the statutory equivalent; the tort claim against the employer was barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity.
- As to Golec, the court held the alleged facts were sufficient to create a jury question whether the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and wilfully disregarded that knowledge.
- The court treated the threshold sufficiency question under the statutory definition as a question of law for the court on summary judgment; if the threshold is met, factual disputes (e.g., actual knowledge and certainty) go to the jury.
- The court limited claims against coemployees to circumstances satisfying the same intentional-tort standard, rather than permitting relabeled negligence theories.
- The court reversed the Court of Appeals in Travis (reinstating summary judgment for the employer) and affirmed in part and remanded in Golec for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- The WDCA provides the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries unless the employee proves a statutory “intentional tort.”
- An employer commits an intentional tort only if it (1) has a specific intent to injure, or (2) has actual knowledge that an injury is certain to occur and wilfully disregards that knowledge.
- Knowledge of a risk, even if serious, and conduct amounting to negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness do not satisfy the statutory intentional-tort standard.
- On summary judgment, the court decides as a matter of law whether the plaintiff’s evidence could satisfy the statutory definition; only then do remaining factual disputes proceed to the jury.
- Coemployee liability for work-related injuries is generally barred and is not expanded by recharacterizing negligent or reckless conduct as “intentional” without meeting the statutory criteria.

## Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court strictly confined the WDCA intentional-tort exception to cases showing either a specific intent to injure or actual knowledge that injury was certain with wilful disregard, holding Travis’s claim barred as a matter of law while allowing Golec’s claim to proceed to a jury on that narrow statutory standard.


Travis v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 453 Mich. 149, 551 N.W.2d 132 (1996)