Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449 (2017)

Facts

  • Missouri’s Department of Natural Resources administered a grant program that reimbursed qualifying nonprofits for installing recycled-tire playground surfaces.
  • Trinity Lutheran Church operated a preschool and daycare with a playground on church property.
  • The church applied for a grant to replace pea gravel with a rubberized surface for improved playground safety.
  • Missouri maintained an express policy denying grants to any entity owned or controlled by a church or other religious organization, citing a state constitutional “no aid” provision.
  • Trinity’s application ranked near the top among applicants but was denied solely because it was operated by a church.

Issues

  1. Whether excluding an otherwise eligible church from a neutral, secular public benefit program solely due to religious status violates the Free Exercise Clause.
  2. Whether such an exclusion is permissible as an effort to avoid establishment concerns reflected in a state “no aid” rule.
  3. What level of scrutiny applies to a policy that imposes a categorical disability on religious entities in a generally available benefits program.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in a 7–2 decision.
  • The Court held that Missouri’s policy violated the Free Exercise Clause by denying an otherwise available public benefit on account of the applicant’s religious status.
  • Because the exclusion was expressly based on religious identity, it triggered strict scrutiny.
  • Missouri’s interest in avoiding any aid to religion, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the discrimination in this context.
  • The Court distinguished prior precedent upholding a denial of funding for clergy training as involving a different, historically sensitive category of religious activity.
  • The Free Exercise Clause bars the government from imposing special disabilities on the basis of religious status, including exclusion from generally available public benefit programs.
  • Express discrimination against religious entities in eligibility rules is subject to strict scrutiny.
  • A generalized preference to avoid establishment concerns does not, by itself, qualify as a compelling interest sufficient to justify denying a neutral benefit based on religious status.
  • A state may have limited leeway to withhold support for certain expressly religious endeavors (such as ministry training), but that rationale does not automatically extend to neutral programs unrelated to worship or religious instruction.
  • The Court’s analysis focused on status-based exclusion in the context of playground resurfacing, leaving broader questions about funding for religious uses unresolved.

Conclusion

Missouri could not categorically disqualify a church from competing for a neutral playground-safety grant solely because the applicant was a religious institution; such status-based discrimination violated the Free Exercise Clause and required strict scrutiny, which the state failed to satisfy.