## Facts

- Robert W. Toth served in the U.S. Air Force in Korea and was honorably discharged.
- After returning to civilian life in Pittsburgh, he worked at a steel plant and had no ongoing connection to the military.
- About five months after discharge, military authorities arrested him on charges of murder and conspiracy allegedly committed while he was an airman in Korea.
- Relying on Article 3(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Air Force transported him back to Korea for trial by court-martial.
- Toth sought habeas relief, challenging military jurisdiction over a discharged servicemember who had resumed civilian status.

## Issues

1. Whether Congress may constitutionally authorize the court-martial of an honorably discharged former servicemember, now a civilian with no present military status, for offenses allegedly committed during prior active duty.
2. Whether Article 3(a) of the UCMJ is a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I power to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces, as applied to such civilians.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and ordered Toth released from military custody.
- The Court held that Congress lacks constitutional authority to subject a discharged civilian ex-servicemember to trial by court-martial for prior service offenses.
- Article 3(a) of the UCMJ, as applied to Toth, was unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress’s Article I power to regulate the armed forces.
- The Court rejected alternative theories based on war powers, the Commander in Chief power, or martial law to justify military trials of civilians.
- The Court stated that Congress could provide for prosecution of such offenses in federal district court, rather than by military tribunal.

## Legal Principles

- Congress’s power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” is limited to persons who are members of, or have a present, continuing relationship with, the armed forces.
- Extending court-martial jurisdiction to civilians who have fully severed military ties improperly shifts criminal adjudication from Article III courts—where defendants receive greater constitutional safeguards—to military tribunals.
- The Fifth Amendment’s exception for “cases arising in the land or naval forces” does not independently confer court-martial jurisdiction; it presupposes whatever military jurisdiction Article I validly authorizes.
- Practical concerns about punishing serious offenses committed during military service cannot expand military jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits; civilian courts remain available as a constitutional forum.

## Conclusion

The Court held that once a servicemember is honorably discharged and returned to civilian life, the Constitution does not permit Congress to subject that person to court-martial for offenses allegedly committed during prior service; any prosecution must proceed in the civilian judicial system with Article III protections.


United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)