## Facts

- In 2001, James Alvin Castleman pleaded guilty in Tennessee to misdemeanor domestic assault for “intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury to” the mother of his child.
- Federal authorities later alleged Castleman possessed firearms and ammunition.
- The United States indicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which bars firearm possession by persons convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
- Castleman moved to dismiss, arguing his state conviction did not qualify because it lacked, as an element, the “use or attempted use of physical force” required by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).
- The district court dismissed, reasoning bodily injury could be caused without “violent” force (e.g., poisoning).
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) required “violent force” comparable to the Armed Career Criminal Act standard.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

## Issues

1. Whether a conviction for intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to a domestic partner qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9) and 921(a)(33)(A).
2. Whether the “use . . . of physical force” in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) requires violent force, or is satisfied by common-law battery force (including offensive touching).
3. Whether causing bodily injury by indirect means (such as poisoning) can constitute the “use” of physical force.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and remanded.
- The Court held Castleman’s Tennessee conviction qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
- The Court held § 922(g)(9)’s “physical force” requirement is satisfied by the force sufficient for common-law battery—offensive touching.
- The Court rejected the view that “physical force” in this context requires “violent force” as in ACCA cases.
- The Court held that knowingly or intentionally causing bodily injury involves the “use” of physical force, even when accomplished indirectly.

## Legal Principles

- For 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), “physical force” includes the common-law meaning of force in battery: offensive touching, however slight.
- The ACCA definition of “violent felony” (and its “violent force” gloss) does not control the meaning of “physical force” for a misdemeanor domestic-violence firearms disability.
- “Domestic violence” in § 922(g)(9) functions as a term of art that can include conduct that might not be labeled “violent” in a non-domestic context.
- The “use” of physical force includes the knowing or intentional application of force through indirect means (e.g., poisoning) that causes bodily injury.
- Under the modified categorical approach, courts may consult certain charging and conviction documents to identify the elements of the offense of conviction for § 921(a)(33)(A) purposes.

## Conclusion

The Court held that a domestic-assault misdemeanor requiring intentional or knowing causation of bodily injury satisfies § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s “use . . . of physical force” element because the statute incorporates common-law battery force, including slight and indirect force, making the conviction a valid predicate for § 922(g)(9)’s firearm prohibition.


United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014)