## Facts

- David and Doris Grigsby owned and operated a taxidermy business in Ontario, Canada, with David doing taxidermy work and Doris handling business operations.
- In connection with their business, the Grigsbys agreed to help a customer, R.W. Ashton, sell African elephant ivory tusks.
- The Grigsbys placed an advertisement for the tusks.
- Kenneth Enright, a U.S. citizen, responded to the advertisement and sought to purchase the tusks.
- Enright asked the Grigsbys to obtain the required Canadian export documentation for the transaction.
- The Grigsbys took steps aimed at satisfying Canadian export requirements and related CITES paperwork and testified that they did not know U.S. law restricted importation of the ivory.
- The United States charged the Grigsbys with conspiracy and related offenses tied to importing raw African elephant ivory into the United States in violation of the African Elephant Conservation Act (AECA).
- At trial, the parties disputed the mens rea required for an AECA criminal violation; the Grigsbys requested an instruction requiring proof that they knowingly violated the law, while the government urged a general-intent instruction.
- The district court instructed the jury that the AECA offense required only general intent, and the jury convicted the Grigsbys.

## Issues

1. Whether criminal liability under the AECA required proof that the defendants knowingly violated the law (specific intent), rather than merely intending to do the acts involved in the transaction (general intent).
2. Whether the district court erred by instructing the jury on a general-intent standard for the AECA counts.
3. Whether the jury needed instruction on statutory and treaty-based exceptions argued to apply to the ivory (including sport-hunted trophy and pre-Convention concepts) when those exceptions affected whether the conduct was unlawful.
4. Whether the instructional error required reversal of the convictions and remand.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit held that the AECA’s criminal provisions at issue required a knowing violation of the law (a specific-intent standard), not merely general intent to carry out the transaction.
- The court ruled that the district court’s general-intent instruction misstated the law and permitted conviction without a finding that the defendants knew their conduct was unlawful under U.S. law.
- The court reversed the Grigsbys’ convictions and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the correct mens rea standard and the statute’s limits on prohibited conduct.

## Legal Principles

- When a criminal statute conditions punishment on a “knowing” violation, the government must prove more than intent to act; it must prove knowledge that the conduct was unlawful (or equivalent culpable awareness as defined by the statute and controlling precedent).
- A jury instruction that lowers the government’s burden on mens rea by substituting general intent for a required knowing-violation standard is reversible error when it can affect the verdict.
- If statutory exceptions or carve-outs define the reach of a criminal prohibition, a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on those limits when supported by the trial theory and evidence.
- On appeal, convictions obtained under legally incorrect instructions must be set aside when the error is not harmless under the record as tried.

## Conclusion

United States v. Grigsby reversed AECA-related ivory-import conspiracy convictions because the jury was instructed that general intent was enough, even though the AECA required proof of a knowing violation of the law; the case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the proper mens rea standard and the statute’s limits and exceptions.


United States v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806 (1997)