## Facts

- A Kentucky grand jury indicted Farris, a mail carrier working aboard the steamboat *General Buell*, for murder, and a state court issued bench warrants directing his arrest.
- Kirby, the sheriff of Gallatin County, Kentucky, received the warrants and, with a posse, boarded the *General Buell* and arrested Farris using only necessary force.
- The arrest caused a temporary delay to the mail and the steamboat’s passage while the carrier was taken into custody.
- Federal prosecutors indicted Kirby and others under § 9 of the Act of March 3, 1825 for “knowingly and wilfully obstructing and retarding” the passage of the mail and a mail carrier.
- Defendants filed a special plea asserting the arrest was execution of valid felony process and that any delay to the mail was incidental and not intended.
- On the government’s demurrer, the question was certified to the Supreme Court whether such an arrest constituted federal mail obstruction.

## Issues

1. Whether arresting a mail carrier under a valid state felony bench warrant, causing incidental delay, constitutes “knowingly and wilfully” obstructing or retarding the passage of the mail under § 9 of the 1825 Act.
2. Whether the statute reaches lawful acts that incidentally delay the mail, or only conduct undertaken with intent to obstruct or retard the mail.

## Decision

- The Court answered the certified question in the negative and held the defendants’ conduct was not punishable under § 9.
- “Knowingly and wilfully” was construed to require that the actor both understands the obstructive effect and acts with the purpose that the mail be obstructed or retarded.
- The statute was held not to cover lawful acts (such as executing a valid felony warrant) from which a temporary mail delay unavoidably follows.
- The Court applied a sensible construction of statutory text to avoid interpretations producing injustice, oppression, or absurd consequences.

## Legal Principles

- Federal criminal statutes using “knowingly and wilfully” require proof of intent to bring about the prohibited obstruction or delay, not merely awareness that delay may occur.
- When the obstructive act is itself unlawful, intent to obstruct may be inferred; when the act is lawful, incidental interference does not satisfy the statute.
- Statutes should be construed sensibly; general language is limited to avoid absurd results that conflict with fundamental legal norms.
- Public service does not immunize a person from arrest on criminal process for felony charges; ordinary criminal process remains available notwithstanding federal employment.

## Conclusion

A sheriff’s execution of a valid state felony bench warrant against a mail carrier, causing only incidental delay to the mail, is not “knowingly and wilfully” obstructing the mail under the 1825 statute; the statute is read to require purposeful obstruction and to avoid absurd outcomes that would impede ordinary criminal justice.


United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868)