## Facts

- Perkins entered the U.S. Naval Academy in 1877 as a cadet engineer and graduated on June 10, 1881.
- Congress had vested the appointment of cadet engineers in the Secretary of the Navy.
- On June 26, 1883, the Secretary notified Perkins that he was “honorably discharged” effective June 30, 1883, with one year’s sea pay, on the ground that he was not needed to fill a vacancy under an 1882 statute.
- Perkins protested that the discharge was unlawful, refused the offered pay, and claimed he remained in naval service.
- Perkins sued in the Court of Claims to recover salary that accrued after June 30, 1883.
- The Court of Claims awarded Perkins $100 for pay from June 30 to September 1, 1883, and the United States appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether a naval cadet engineer appointed by the Secretary of the Navy was an “officer in the military or naval service” protected against peacetime dismissal except by court-martial under Rev. Stat. § 1229.
2. Whether, when Congress vests appointment of inferior officers in a department head, Congress may by statute limit the department head’s power to remove those officers.
3. Whether an attempted discharge in violation of Rev. Stat. § 1229 leaves the officer in service and entitled to pay after the purported discharge date.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judgment for Perkins.
- The Court held Perkins was an inferior officer and an “officer in the military or naval service” within Rev. Stat. § 1229.
- The Court held Congress may restrict removal of inferior officers whose appointment Congress has vested in department heads.
- The Court held the Secretary’s peacetime discharge of Perkins, not pursuant to court-martial (and not based on statutory grounds such as deficiency or misconduct), was ineffective.
- Because the discharge was ineffective, Perkins remained in service and could recover the pay attached to the position for the period claimed.

## Legal Principles

- When Congress vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments under the Appointments Clause, Congress may limit and restrict removal of those officers by statute.
- An appointee made an inferior officer by lawful department-head appointment is an “officer” (not a mere employee) for purposes of statutory protections applicable to officers.
- A peacetime dismissal of a protected military or naval officer that does not comply with a statutory court-martial requirement is a nullity, and the officer remains entitled to compensation incident to the office.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld statutory limits on a department head’s removal authority over inferior officers and ruled that a peacetime discharge of a protected naval officer without the required court-martial procedures does not terminate the officer’s status or right to salary.


United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886)