## Facts

- The federal government prosecuted Clarence Frederick Schmidt for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112, with federal jurisdiction based on Schmidt’s status as an enrolled Indian and the offense occurring within the Rosebud Indian Reservation in South Dakota (18 U.S.C. § 1153).
- Around midnight on June 30–July 1, 1979, Mark D. Von Heeder was driving east on U.S. Highway 18 near Mission, South Dakota, approaching the Antelope Housing Community.
- Schmidt, driving a car with four passengers, entered the highway from a north turnoff for the Antelope Community and crossed in front of Von Heeder’s oncoming vehicle.
- Von Heeder’s car struck Schmidt’s vehicle in the right rear quarter panel, rolled several times, and came to rest off the southeast corner of the intersection; Schmidt’s car came to rest in a field on the southwest side of the highway.
- Von Heeder died at the scene, apparently from a broken neck; no one else died.
- Trial evidence (some of it conflicting) allowed the jury to infer that Schmidt was intoxicated and speeding when he failed to stop at a stop sign controlling entry onto the highway.
- There was evidence Schmidt knew his brakes were defective.
- Just before the collision, a passenger alerted Schmidt to Von Heeder’s approaching car and advised Schmidt to apply the emergency brake.
- The district court instructed the jury on the governing law, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.
- On appeal, Schmidt argued the proof showed, at most, simple negligence rather than the gross negligence required for involuntary manslaughter.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Schmidt acted with the gross negligence (wanton or reckless disregard for human life) required for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112.
2. Whether any negligence by the decedent negated causation or otherwise defeated Schmidt’s criminal liability where Schmidt’s conduct was found to be a proximate cause of death.

## Decision

- The Eighth Circuit affirmed Schmidt’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter.
- The court held there was substantial evidence from which the jury could find gross negligence based on the combined proof of intoxication, speeding, ignoring a stop sign, knowledge of defective brakes, and disregard of a passenger warning and suggestion to use the emergency brake.
- The court rejected the argument that the evidence established only simple negligence.
- The court held that alleged contributory negligence by the decedent did not bar the conviction where Schmidt’s conduct could be found a proximate cause of the death.

## Legal Principles

- Involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112 requires proof of gross negligence: a wanton or reckless disregard for human life, with knowledge that the conduct threatens others or knowledge of circumstances that would allow the defendant to foresee the danger to others.
- On sufficiency review, the appellate court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and asks whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the court does not reweigh conflicting evidence.
- In a homicide prosecution, the government need not prove the victim was free from negligence; victim contributory negligence does not excuse a defendant whose grossly negligent conduct is a proximate cause of death.
- A jury may infer gross negligence from the cumulative effect of intoxication and dangerous driving choices, including failure to obey traffic control devices, driving at excessive speed, operating with known mechanical defects, and ignoring warnings of immediate danger.
- Proximate cause is satisfied when the defendant’s grossly negligent conduct sets in motion the events that result in death, even if other factors may also have played a role.

## Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit affirmed Schmidt’s involuntary manslaughter conviction because, taking the trial evidence in the government’s favor, a reasonable jury could find Schmidt acted with wanton or reckless disregard for human life by driving while intoxicated and speeding, running a stop sign onto a through-highway at night despite known defective brakes, and failing to respond to a passenger’s warning and advice to use the emergency brake; any negligence by the decedent did not defeat causation where Schmidt’s conduct could be found a proximate cause of the fatal crash.


United States v. Schmidt, 626 F. 2d 616 (1980)