## Facts

- John and Mary Kumpf bought a large tract of land, platted and subdivided it, and graded a dirt road intended to serve as a subdivision street.
- The Kumpfs later vacated all subdivided lots except Lots 1 through 6; at the time of the vacation, they had not sold any lots.
- The graded access way consisted of a traveled dirt road about 20 feet wide, with grass strips about 20 feet wide on each side.
- Donald and Nancy Ferris bought Lot 5 (within the remaining subdivision) and also acquired Lot 8 (in the vacated portion); the Ferrises could reach Lot 8 through Lot 5.
- Rick and Pamela Jones bought Lot 6 (within the remaining subdivision).
- Norman and Valna Stettler bought Lot 7 (in the vacated portion), which lacked access to a public road except by using the graded dirt road.
- The dirt road ran alongside or served Lots 5 through 8, and the Ferrises, the Joneses, and the Stettlers used it to reach their properties; they sometimes used the adjacent grass strips for parking or maneuvering.
- Johnny and Bonnie Whitt later bought the surrounding property, including the land on which the dirt road and grass strips lay.
- Whitt objected to plaintiffs’ continued use and erected a fence blocking access.
- Plaintiffs sued to establish their right to use the road and to stop Whitt from interfering; Whitt counterclaimed for trespass.
- After a bench trial, the trial court granted plaintiffs a 60-foot-wide easement (road plus both grass strips), enjoined Whitt from interference, and denied Whitt’s trespass claim.

## Issues

1. Whether the plaintiffs proved an easement by implication/necessity over the dirt road across Whitt’s land.
2. If an easement existed, whether the trial court erred by setting its width at 60 feet, including the grass strips.
3. Whether Whitt was entitled to relief on the trespass counterclaim.

## Decision

- The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.
- The court upheld the existence of an implied access right over Whitt’s property based on the parties’ common source of title and the need for access created at severance, particularly for the landlocked Lot 7.
- The court reversed the trial court’s 60-foot width determination and directed that the easement be limited to the portion reasonably necessary for ingress and egress (centered on the traveled roadway rather than the full road-and-grass corridor).
- The court left the denial of Whitt’s trespass counterclaim undisturbed to the extent plaintiffs’ use fell within the properly limited easement.

## Legal Principles

- A way of necessity may be implied when a tract held in common ownership is divided so that one parcel is left without access to a public road; the necessity must exist at the time of severance.
- An easement implied from the circumstances of severance is based on the inferred intent of the parties and the access conditions existing when the land was divided.
- The scope of an implied easement is confined to what is reasonably necessary for the dominant parcel’s use and enjoyment; it does not grant a broader right merely because a wider strip was shown on paper or was occasionally used for convenience.
- Occasional parking or vehicle maneuvering on adjacent grassy areas does not, by itself, justify treating the entire corridor as the easement when the access need is satisfied by the traveled roadway.

## Conclusion

*Whitt v. Ferris* held that the plaintiffs established an implied access easement over the graded dirt road crossing Whitt’s land, with the access need arising from the division of commonly owned property that left at least one parcel without a public-road outlet. The court, however, rejected the trial court’s 60-foot-wide easement and limited the right-of-way to the area reasonably necessary for ingress and egress along the roadway.


Whitt v. Ferris, 596 N.E.2d 230 (1992)