Cable v. State, 436 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1983)

Facts

  • An undercover narcotics officer, Richard Swann, met Cable through an informant to arrange a cocaine purchase.
  • Cable and Swann spent the evening traveling to multiple locations attempting to find cocaine, including a game room and a convenience-store parking lot where Cable’s brother (William) was present.
  • At the game room, Cable asked Swann to come outside and led him to a more secluded area on the far side of the building.
  • William approached Swann with large hedge clippers, pressed them to Swann’s throat, and threatened to kill him.
  • Cable stayed immediately behind Swann while William and another man searched Swann’s wallet and patted him down, including requiring Swann to remove his shoes.
  • After concluding Swann was not a police officer, the men let him leave and suggested he return another night for narcotics.
  • Cable was arrested and charged with aggravated assault based on the hedge-clipper incident, even though he did not personally hold the clippers.

Issues

  1. Whether evidence was sufficient to convict Cable of aggravated assault as a principal where an accomplice wielded the hedge clippers and made the threats.
  2. Whether Cable’s conduct before and during the assault permitted a jury to infer intentional participation or aiding and abetting in the aggravated assault.
  3. Whether hedge clippers, used by pressing them to a victim’s throat while threatening to kill, could qualify as a deadly weapon for aggravated-assault purposes.

Decision

  • The appellate court affirmed Cable’s aggravated-assault conviction.
  • The court held the evidence permitted a finding that Cable acted in concert with others and was liable as a principal despite not wielding the hedge clippers.
  • The circumstances supported an inference that Cable facilitated the confrontation and remained in a position consistent with participation rather than mere presence.
  • A defendant may be convicted as a principal for a crime committed by another if the defendant intentionally assists, encourages, or participates in the criminal act.
  • Mere presence is insufficient, but intent and participation may be inferred from coordinated actions before, during, and after the offense.
  • An object not inherently designed as a weapon may constitute a “deadly weapon” when used in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm, such as being held to a victim’s throat with a threat to kill.

Conclusion

The court upheld Cable’s aggravated-assault conviction because the jury could reasonably find, from Cable’s coordinated conduct and proximity during the threat, that he aided and participated in the assault as a principal, even though his accomplice physically used the hedge clippers.