## Facts

- David Molko and Tracy Leal alleged they were recruited into the Unification Church after members misrepresented or concealed that the group was religious.
- The alleged misrepresentations induced them to attend retreats and programs featuring intensive schedules, lectures, and group activities.
- Plaintiffs offered expert testimony that the recruitment and indoctrination methods constituted “coercive persuasion,” impairing independent judgment and supporting theories of fraud, undue influence, and emotional distress.
- While fundraising for the Church in public, both plaintiffs were forcibly abducted by deprogrammers hired by their parents and later left the Church.
- Plaintiffs sued the Church for fraud and deceit, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and false imprisonment; Molko also sought restitution of a $6,000 gift allegedly obtained through undue influence.
- The Church conceded initial misrepresentation by members but argued plaintiffs could not show actionable reliance because Molko knew the Church’s identity by the time he formally joined.
- The Church filed cross-complaints (including civil-rights theories) against individuals involved in deprogramming activities.

## Issues

1. Whether the Free Exercise Clauses of the federal and California Constitutions bar tort claims against a religious organization based on allegedly deceptive, secular recruitment conduct.
2. Whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence of misrepresentation, reliance/causation, and severe emotional distress to defeat summary judgment on fraud, IIED, and related undue influence/restitution theories.
3. Whether a religious organization may pursue civil-rights-based cross-claims against deprogrammers and others arising from efforts to remove members from the organization.
4. Whether California equitable indemnity permits comparative indemnity among concurrent intentional tortfeasors.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court reversed summary judgment in part and remanded, holding that plaintiffs’ fraud and IIED claims (and related undue influence/restitution theory) could proceed.
- The court held the Free Exercise Clause does not immunize a religious organization from generally applicable tort liability for deceptive conduct concerning secular facts used in recruitment.
- The court rejected the Church’s narrow reliance theory, concluding that concealment at the outset could be a substantial factor by causing plaintiffs to unwittingly expose themselves to the recruitment environment alleged to impair judgment.
- The court substantially limited the Church’s civil-rights cross-claims in this context.
- The court restricted the availability of comparative equitable indemnity among intentional tortfeasors, declining to treat intentional-tort indemnity as a simple extension of negligence-based comparative principles.

## Legal Principles

- Neutral, generally applicable tort law may be applied to religious organizations when adjudication focuses on deceptive, secular conduct rather than the validity of religious doctrine.
- A state may impose liability for fraudulent recruitment where deception deprives individuals of an informed choice about whether to participate and exposes them to assertedly coercive influence; the state interest in preventing such harm can justify incidental burdens on religious exercise.
- Reliance and causation in fraud may be satisfied where the misrepresentation operates by inducing initial exposure to conditions that later affect decisionmaking, even if the plaintiff later learns the true affiliation.
- Courts may consider expert evidence on alleged psychological influence to determine whether triable issues exist on voluntariness-related theories (including undue influence) at the summary judgment stage, without deciding religious truth.
- Comparative equitable indemnity is limited in intentional-tort settings; intentional wrongdoers cannot assume ordinary comparative shifting of responsibility among other intentional tortfeasors.
- Civil-rights statutes should not be expansively applied as counter-claims in a way that would broadly chill third-party intervention or criticism; such claims require careful, context-specific limits.

## Conclusion

The court held that former members may pursue fraud and IIED claims against a religious organization based on deceptive, secular recruitment practices that allegedly induced unwitting exposure to coercive influence, and it reversed summary judgment on those core claims while limiting related civil-rights cross-claims and restricting comparative indemnity among intentional tortfeasors.


Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 46 Cal. 3d 1092 (Cal. 1988)