People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290 (Cal. 1981)

Facts

  • Robert Lee Watson drank large quantities of beer at a bar in Redding, California, on the night of January 2–3, 1979.
  • About 1.5 hours after leaving the bar, he ran a red light and narrowly avoided a collision only by skidding to a stop in the intersection.
  • After the near-collision, Watson drove away at high speed toward another intersection.
  • He braked but struck a Toyota sedan; three passengers were ejected, and the Toyota’s driver and her six-year-old daughter were killed.
  • Physical and expert evidence indicated Watson traveled roughly 84 mph before braking and about 70 mph at impact in a 35-mph zone, leaving substantial skid marks before and after impact.
  • Evidence supported an inference that Watson had a very high blood-alcohol level and, after the first near-collision, was on notice of the danger of continuing to drive.

Issues

  1. Whether the preliminary hearing evidence, viewed favorably to the prosecution, provided a rational basis to suspect implied malice, permitting prosecution for second-degree murder arising from a fatal drunk-driving collision.
  2. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing the murder counts on the ground that the evidence showed, at most, gross negligence supporting vehicular manslaughter.

Decision

  • The California Supreme Court reversed the pretrial order dismissing the second-degree murder counts.
  • The Court held that the preliminary hearing evidence could support a finding of implied malice under Penal Code § 188.
  • The Court remanded for further proceedings, allowing prosecution on the murder counts to continue.
  • Implied malice exists when a defendant intentionally commits an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life, with knowledge that the act endangers life, and with conscious disregard for life.
  • Vehicular manslaughter based on gross negligence requires a lesser mental state than implied malice; the key distinction is implied malice’s subjective awareness and conscious disregard of a grave risk to human life.
  • Intoxication alone does not establish implied malice, but intoxication combined with highly dangerous driving may support an inference of the required subjective awareness and conscious disregard.
  • At a preliminary hearing, the prosecution need only show a rational ground or reasonable suspicion that the charged offense was committed; the court does not decide guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

Because the evidence of intoxication, extreme speeding, running red lights, and the prior near-collision could support an inference that Watson recognized a lethal risk and chose to continue, the murder counts were improperly dismissed and could proceed on an implied-malice theory.