Pizano v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 128, 577 P.2d 659 (Cal. 1978)

Facts

  • Two armed, masked men forced entry into a home shared by Vaca and Coverdell and robbed them.
  • Coverdell identified Esquivel as the gunman and testified that Pizano resembled the second robber.
  • A neighbor, Cuna, armed himself with a rifle and moved toward the house after the robbery was reported.
  • During the escape, Esquivel seized Vaca and held him at gunpoint as a human shield, threatening to kill him if police intervened.
  • Cuna, believing he was firing at Esquivel and unaware Vaca was positioned as a shield, shot and accidentally killed Vaca.
  • Pizano and Esquivel were charged with robbery-related offenses and with Vaca’s murder, although neither robber fired the fatal shot.

Issues

  1. Whether a robber may be held for implied-malice murder when a third party, unaware the victim is being used as a human shield, accidentally kills the victim while trying to stop the robbers’ escape.
  2. Whether the use of a victim as a shield can be found to proximately cause the victim’s death, notwithstanding the third party’s lack of awareness of the shield.

Decision

  • The California Supreme Court denied Pizano’s petition for a writ of prohibition and permitted prosecution on the murder count to proceed.
  • The court held there was sufficient evidence that the robbers’ act of using Vaca as a human shield could constitute malicious conduct supporting implied malice and could be found the proximate cause of death.
  • The court treated prior “in response to” language concerning third-party killings as a causation guideline, not a rigid requirement applicable to shield cases.
  • Implied-malice murder may be based on a defendant’s own life-endangering conduct that proximately causes death, even when the fatal act is committed by a third party.
  • In “shield” situations, the trier of fact may find proximate cause from the felon’s act of placing the victim in foreseeable danger of being shot by an intervenor attempting to stop the felony or escape, regardless of the intervenor’s subjective awareness of the victim’s presence.
  • The limitation that felony murder generally does not apply to killings committed by non-felons does not bar implied-malice liability when the felon’s independent malicious conduct, beyond the underlying felony, proximately causes the death.
  • Conduct such as seizing a victim as a human shield during an armed escape, coupled with threats and anticipation of armed resistance, can support a finding of conscious disregard for life.

Conclusion

The court held that using a victim as a human shield during an armed robbery escape may support an implied-malice murder charge when a third party accidentally kills the victim, because the shield use can be found to be an independently malicious act that proximately causes the death even if the shooter did not realize the victim was present.